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The problem of public sector fiscal constraints has provoked
policy makers in many countries to search for alternatives to
traditional public finance. One of the alternatives currently under
exploration and growing in application is privatization. Privatization
involves the use of private sector financial and other resources in the
provision of infrastructure and other goods and services traditionally
provided by the government. In this thesis, the focus is restricted to
the use of private financial resources for investments in transportation
infrastructure.
Despite recent growth in its application, the privatization
concept is not yet thoroughly understood. In particular, there remains
an incomplete understanding of those characteristics of public finance
policy contexts most conducive to its application. In this thesis, we
conclude that among the most important characteristics are
distributional objectives and underlying distributional principles. On
the basis of a comparison of the recent use of private funds to finance
investments in transportation infrastructure in the United States and
Sweden, we conclude that to the extent that the distributional
objectives implicit in public finance policy cause it to be oriented
towards the benefit principle of distributional equity, private
financial resources are likely to be allocated to infrastructure
projects; and, alternatively, to the extent that the distributional
objectives of public finance policy cause it to be oriented towards the
ability-to-pay principle, private funds are less likely to be allocated
to infrastructure needs. The comparison also serves as the basis of the
following conclusions. Private financial resources are more likely to
be allocated to infrastructure needs to the extent that (1) government
fiscal constraints are severe and structural, (2) the public sector is
able to provide administrative and other support to privatization
efforts, and (3) there is legislative support for the privatization
concept and its applications.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Karen R. Polenske
Title: Professor of Regional Political Economy
and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In many countries, governments are finding it increasingly
difficult to generate financial resources commensurate with the
requirements of public works infrastructure systems. Public works
infrastructure systems constitute the physical framework required to
support most economic activity. They are, generally, characterized by
high fixed costs, strong links to economic development, long service
life, inter-system interactions, and public ownership. In the United
States, the composition of public works infrastructure, as defined in
the Public Works Improvement Act of 1984, includes: highways, streets,
bridges, sidewalks; lighting; mass resource recovery facilities;
airports and airway facilities; water supply and distribution systems;
wastewater collection, treatment and related facilities; docks, dams;
ports and waterways; space facilities; transportation and other rail
facilities and equipment; communication facilities, power production
facilities, and other facilities critical for national economic
development (National Council of Public Works Improvement (NCPWI), 1986,
pp. 2, 76). The precise factors underlying government difficulties in
generating the requisite funds vary, but generally include the high and
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rising costs of public good and service provisioni, public deficit
reduction efforts, political opposition, and legislative obstacles to
public fund-raising efforts.
In the United States, the difficulty that governments face in
generating sufficient financial resources for infrastructure is
suggested in recent trends in state and local government public works
spending. Over the last two decades, state and local governments have
steadily reduced public works expenditures. According to an NCPWI
report (1986, pp. 48-49, 52), as a percentage of total state and local
government expenditures, public works construction, operation, and
maintenance expenditures have declined from 13.5 percent in the early
to-mid-1960s to 6.6 percent in 1984; moreover, as a percentage of gross
national product (GNP), state and local public works expenditures have
declined from 3.7 percent in 1961 to 2.7 percent in 1984. The trends
suggested in these figures are of particular significance and concern
considering that state and local government expenditures have accounted
for approximately 70 percent of total public expenditures on public
works facilities over the last two decades (NCPWI, 1986, p. 52).
'Much of the high cost of infrastructure provision in the United States,
for instance, is attributable to the high cost of rehabilitation and
maintenance as a result of factors such as (1) the "historical rhythm" of
infrastructure production, which has created the need to replace and
rehabilitate almost simultaneously much U.S. infrastructure; (2) political
pressures to use public funds for conspicuous and popular items, to improve
public budget balances, and to minimize tax increases; (3) the lack of
institutional arrangements suitable to the needs of infrastructure maintenance
and rehabilitation; (4) the high costs of labor and other inputs into
infrastructure rehabilitation; and (5) the lack of sufficient innovation in
the area of technology for major infrastructure rehabilitation efforts.
(Gakenheimer, 1985.)
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The results of other research also indicate that state and local
government expenditures on public works have experienced significant
declines. According to Peterson (1983, pp. 6, 9; and 1984, pp. 110-
116), between 1968 and 1983, state and local government public-works
capital expenditures declined in real terms, and net capital
expenditures declined faster than gross capital spending, suggesting a
rapid accumulation and depreciation of older public-works capital.
Consequently, asserted Peterson, the rate of net addition to the state
and local public works capital approached zero by the early 1980s.
Peterson extrapolated the data and suggested that by the mid-1980s,
there would be a net disinvestment in the nation's capital stock as
inherited public works assets were exploited at progressively faster
rates. Federal government spending trends reflect the same patterns.
Physical capital investment fell from 24.3 percent of federal government
expenditures in 1960 to 11 percent in 1990 and is expected to decline
further to 10.7 percent in 1991 (Aschauer, 1990).
The financial difficulties faced by U.S governments in their
efforts to provide public works infrastructure is illustrative of the
experiences of a large and growing number of countries. In many
industrialized countries, where infrastructure systems are either coming
to or past the age of substantial and costly reconstruction and
renovation, and in many less-developed counties where frequently the
rudimentary infrastructure foundations are still incomplete, fiscal
constraints are hampering efforts to establish and maintain efficient
public-works systems. Thus, the problem analyzed in this thesis--
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financial constraints on public expenditures on infrastructure systems--
is one of broad concern.
Financial constraints on public-works expenditures are
significant because of the implications for economic growth and
development. Analysts commonly accept that public-works infrastructure
provides many of the facilities and services essential for the
achievement and maintenance of national and international
competitiveness and strength required to foster national economic growth
and development (Polenske and Currea, 1985, pp. 55-63; NCPWI, 1988, pp.
34-36; Humplick, et al., 1990, p. 2). Private sector productivity, for
instance, depends heavily on an adequate and well-maintained stock of
public-sector capital. If infrastructure systems do not keep pace with
private-sector capital needs, private investment, productivity, and
growth fall, and the rate of return to private capital declines. Part
of the reduction in U.S. international competitiveness has been
attributed to falling investment and deterioration of the quality of
U.S. infrastructure systems (Aschauer, 1990). Although the precise
nature of the relationship between infrastructure, growth, and
development has yet to be clearly and definitively established,
analysts, nevertheless, generally acknowledge that by serving as the
physical foundation for the efficient undertaking of all directly
productive economic activity, and by contributing to and supporting
capital formation processes, infrastructure is an essential input into
economic growth and development processes (Pagano and Moore, 1985, pp.
6-8). Hence, any obstacle to its formation and maintenance, such as
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fiscal constraints, holds significance and merits attention.
Our objective in this study is to contribute to a better
understanding of the concept of privatization within the context of
infrastructure financing. In particular, we identify factors
influential in the determination of when and to what extent the concept
is applied in those contexts in which governments are constrained in
their ability to generate the financial resources required for the
provision of infrastructure. To achieve this objective, we conduct a
comparative analysis of the use of private funds for infrastructure
projects in the United States and Sweden- -countries in which public
finance policies are characterized by very different degrees in the use
of private funds.
The Privatization Alternative
Traditionally, most infrastructure in most countries has been
financed publicly. The market's failure to allocate the financial and
other resources required for the production of infrastructure services
and facilities provides the chief justification for this policy. In
recent years, an alternative policy solution to the market's failure to
allocate efficiently the financial and other resources required for the
provision of infrastructure has emerged. It is referred to as
privatization. Broadly speaking, privatization is defined as private
sector involvement in the financing, design, construction, maintenance,
operation, and/or ownership of traditionally "public" facilities, goods,
and services (Goldman and Mokuvos, 1984, xiv, 9-27; Sculley and Cole,
1985, p. 85; Weiss, 1987, p. xviii;). In this study, we restrict our
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discussion of privatization to its financing element, i.e., private
financing of infrastructure, by which we refer to financing that is
based on the benefit principle. This is financing, in which the costs
of facilities and services are allocated among their users in proportion
to the benefits that the users receive from their use.
In the pure case of private financing, there is no cross-
subsidization of infrastructure costs; facilities and services are paid
for exclusively by their beneficiaries in proportion to the benefits
received, and there is no sharing of facility costs with
nonbeneficiaries. Thus, for new infrastructure that provides exclusive
benefits to a particular population, private financing means that total
facility costs are paid for exclusively by the beneficiary population.
For existing infrastructure that is improved or expanded to serve new
needs, private financing means that the associated costs are incurred by
the population that creates the need for the improvement or expansion.
When the excess capacity of infrastructure facilities is used to meet
new needs, private financing means that the population that uses the
excess capacity bears the associated costs. Although such a pure case
rarely, if ever, exists in practice, for purposes of identifying the
arguments, we counterpose this pure private financing case with a pure
public funded one.
Private finance differs from public finance in the sense that
under the latter there is cross-subsidization or sharing of costs both
between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries and among different levels of
beneficiaries. When infrastructure is publicly financed, the facilities
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and services are paid for, either partially or fully, by individuals
other than those who benefit from them. In this context, any
infrastructure financing arrangement in which users and nonusers are
assessed costs and/or in which the same rate structure is used for
different categories of users--marginal and established, large and
small--is a form of public finance. Thus, taxes, user fees and, other
uniformly applied service charges that make no distinction between users
and nonusers and between different categories of users and the costs
associated with their use, are forms of public financing. Because of
the cross-subsidy effect of public finance, it is, typically, used to
achieve redistributional objectives.
Moreover, when we speak of private finance, we are not referring
to the capital structure of the financing entity. We are not concerned
with whether or not the entity is a private company- -financed with the
equity capital provided by numerous private individual investors. What
concerns us is how the entity allocates the costs of the goods and
services it provides. For this study, then, we are not concerned with
the fact that the International Telegraph and Telephone Company (ITT) is
a privately held company, financed with private equity capital (rather
than the proceeds of municipal debt issues); what is important is that
because it subsidizes the local use of telephone services with the
proceeds of charges that exceed the costs of long-distance telephone
use, it has, in effect, instituted a form of public finance.
Furthermore, whenever we speak of finance, we will be referring
to the source of funds used to pay capital investment costs, that is,
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how such funds are raised. This is in contrast to financing that refers
to the final incidence of capital costs, or who actually pays in the
end. Thus, when bonds are issued to pay for infrastructure, the
revenues generated from their sale constitute the form of financing we
will cover, and the payments made by taxpayers and others to retire the
bonds constitutes another form of financing. We will use the term
financing to refer to how capital is raised.
Theoretically, private funds can be used to finance virtually
every type of infrastructure facility and service; in the United States,
there are examples of the privatization of most types of infrastructure.
For practical purposes, however, we limit this study to private
financing of transportation infrastructure--facilities and heavy capital
equipment that comprise those systems, such as, roads, bridges,
airports, railroads, mass transit, waterways, ports and docks, used to
move people and to deliver goods and services.
In addition to practical considerations, a second justification
for this delimitation of the scope of the study is the relative size of
transportation infrastructure in public-works budgets: it tends to be
comparatively large. In the United States, for instance, depending on
the source and period of reference, expenditures on transportation
infrastructure have accounted for two-thirds to three-fourths of total
public works spending (U.S. Congressional Reports, 1984 and 1985;
Associated General Contractors, 1983; and Choate and Walter, 1981). In
1984, approximately 69 percent of all U.S. Federal, state, and local
public-works expenditures were on airports, highways, waterways, ports,
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lock and mass transit facilities (NCPWI, 1986, p. 52). Humplick et al.
(1990, p. 3) estimate that 18 percent of the U.S. gross national product
is spent on transportation infrastructure; and 10 percent of the U.S.
workforce is employed in transport-related industry. They illustrate
the importance of transportation facilities in the U.S. economy further
by pointing out that the U.S. highway system, for instance, is the
single largest category of public-works assets, and that the capital
stock of the nation's aviation and public transit facilities has
experienced rapid growth in recent years (Humplick, et al., 1990, p. 3).
A third rationale for limiting the focus of the study to
transportation infrastructure is the importance of such facilities to
economic growth and development processes. The importance of
transportation infrastructure in development and growth processes has
been documented by many authors (USDOT, 1989,; Humplick, et al., 1990,
p. 2; Lakshmanan and Elhance, 1985). Lakshmanan and Elhance, for
instance, show that inadequate transportation systems hinder the supply
and demand mechanisms that underlie growth and development processes.
In agricultural regions, poor transportation systems can result in
delays and high costs that can, in turn, result in damage to perishable
farm output and, thereby, discourage increases in agricultural
production. Industrial production is also vulnerable to the quality of
transportation systems. Inadequate transportation complicates efforts
to access production inputs and get outputs to market. It may also
encourage the inefficient accumulation of inventory that is sometimes
necessary to counteract the effects of slow, unreliable, and costly
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transport systems. (An accumulation of inventory is inefficient to the
extent it adds more to overhead or fixed costs than it does to
revenues.) Furthermore, communities that are isolated because of poor
transportation facilities are frequently unable to partake in the
communication necessary to acquire data regarding market opportunities,
production techniques, and other information required to maximize
efficient development and growth.
Transport facilities provide the physical linkages required to
maximize distribution and production efficiencies--to conduct trade and
other economic activities among local, regional, national, and
international centers of production activity, and among raw material
sources, intermediate production points and final production points. By
providing these linkages, transportation infrastructure reduces the
costs and improves the efficiency of production, distribution, and
capital formation processes, and, thereby, facilitates economic
development and growth. Consequently, to the extent that transportation
facilities are inadequate, production and distribution efficiency,
capital formation, and consequently economic development and growth are
sacrificed.
Theoretical Arguments
The conclusions we have obtained in this study evolve out of the
juxtaposition and comparison of two very different theoretical responses
to the empirically observed problem of the market's failure to allocate
efficiently the resources required for the provision of infrastructure--
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the theory of market failure and the theory of property rights.
According to the theory of market failure, market inefficiency in the
provision of infrastructure is best overcome through a policy of
government intervention. Thus, the government is called upon to
regulate, and, in many instances, completely undertake the provision of
those services and facilities that markets fail to allocate efficiently
the required resources. The theory of market failure is a broadly
accepted and well-established intellectual basis for infrastructure
provision policy; thus, for many years, in most countries,
infrastructure has been mainly financed by the government.
Alternatively, according to the theory of property rights, market
inefficiency in the provision of infrastructure is best overcome through
a policy of (re)structuring the rights of ownership to the required
resources so that they are privately held. The theory provides the
intellectual basis for privatization policy, and of particular relevance
within the context of this thesis, it serves as the intellectual basis
of a policy for the private financing of infrastructure. According to
the theory of property rights, market provision of infrastructure can be
improved to the extent that the ownership rights to the financial
resources required for its provision are privately held.
During the course of this discussion, we make several
observations. We observe, for instance, that the theories of market
failure and property rights are used to analyze the same empirically-
observed problem--the market's failure to allocate productive resources
efficiently; and that they are used to seek the same objective--
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economically efficient resource allocations. We observe, further, that
although the analysts who apply the theories are trying to solve the
same problem and seek the same objective, they prescribe totally
different policy solutions. The market failure theorists prescribe a
policy of extensive government intervention into those economic
activities that markets fail to perform efficiently; and the property
rights theorists prescribe a policy of (re)structuring the ownership
rights to those resources that markets allocate inefficiently, thereby,
encouraging market efficiency.
Most important, we observe that the two policy prescriptions are
consistent with conflicting principles of distributional equity. The
policy prescribed under the theory of market failure is consistent with
the ability-to-pay principle, and the policy prescribed under the
property rights theory is consistent with the benefit principle. Also,
the decision to implement one policy or the other or some combination of
the two depends on the distributional objectives and underlying
principles of the implementing body. Finally, we observe that implicit
in both theories and their policy prescriptions is a neglect of many
other important factors--i.e., economic, administrative, legislative,
institutional, and political, to name a few--that shape public finance
policy, in general, and infrastructure finance policy, in particular.
To develop and attempt to implement infrastructure provision policy
without consideration of some of these economic, institutional,
political, administrative, and other influential factors reduces the
utility of the policy.
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Part of our objective in this study is to add to the general
level of understanding of these factors by identifying those factors
that underlie the differences in the use of private resources in U.S.
and Swedish infrastructure provision policy. Our principal finding is,
for instance, that whether and to what extent a government implements
one policy solution or the other or some combination of the two to
correct the market's failure to allocate of resources required for the
provision of infrastructure will depend, largely, but not exclusively,
on the distributional objectives and underlying principles implicit in
public finance policy of the implementing body. We assert, in
particular, that in those public finance policy contexts more oriented
toward the application of the benefit principle of distributional
equity--that is, the costs of government-provided services and
facilities are allocated among their beneficiaries in proportion to the
benefits they reap from government output--private funds are more likely
to be used to finance infrastructure. Alternatively, in those public
finance policy contexts more oriented toward application of the ability-
to-pay principle--the costs of government-provided output are allocated
among consumers on the basis of their abilities-to-pay (or size of
income)--private funds are less likely to be used to finance
infrastructure. In these contexts, the policy prescribed under the
theory of market failure--public finance--is more likely to be applied.
We establish the validity of this proposition in subsequent
chapters through an analysis and comparison of privatization in the
United States and in Sweden. We show that in the United States where
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the benefit principle has recently emerged as an influence within the
context of public finance policy, private funds are more frequently used
to finance infrastructure than in Sweden, where the ability-to-pay
principle has exerted a relatively strong influence on public finance
policy. In the appendix, we provide details on how we collected the
data used to support this proposition. In addition to the identification
of the role of distributional objectives and principles in the
determination of whether and to what extent private funds are used to
finance infrastructure, we also identify other subsidiary factors--
economic, administrative, and legislative--that influence the use of
private funds for infrastructure.
We also intend that this study contribute to a better cross-
cultural understanding of the recent orientation in national public
finance policy, and its effect on infrastructure provision policy. U.S.
readers, for instance, might be interested to note that, in Sweden,
where the objective of the redistribution of income to achieve vertical
income equality has, in recent years, been one of high priority, Swedish
public finance policy has been characterized by a strong commitment to
the ability-to-pay principle of distributional equity, which perhaps
provides part of the explanation for why Swedish infrastructure finance
policy incorporates limited amount of private participation. U.S.
readers might also be interested in how private funds have been made
available for Swedish public works projects.
Conversely, Swedish readers might be interested to note that in
the United States, a public finance policy objective of increasing
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influence is the intergenerational allocation of infrastructure costs on
the basis of benefits received; consequently, U.S. public finance policy
is increasingly guided by the benefit principle of distributional
equity, which perhaps partially explains why U.S. infrastructure
provision policy incorporates relatively more private financing than
Swedish policy. Swedish readers might also gain from the thesis through
the description provided of some of the techniques by which private
funds have been tapped for infrastructure projects in the United States.
Structure of the Study
In Chapter 2, we present two theoretical arguments pertaining to
the market's failure to allocate resources for the provision of
infrastructure efficiently--the theories of market failure and property
rights. We will argue that although the theories provide us with a
framework for the analysis of the problem of inefficient market
provision (in this case, the financing) of infrastructure, their utility
as the basis of policy formation is limited, because they do not reflect
the role of various economic, administrative, legislative,
institutional, political, and other factors that invariably influence
policy choice. Also, we suggest that among the neglected factors are
the distributional objectives and underlying principles of public
finance policy, and that the decision to implement one policy solution,
or the other, or some combination of the two will depend on those
objectives and principles in addition to numerous other variables. We
conclude the chapter with the proposition that the extent to which
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private funds are used to finance infrastructure is largely a function
of the degree to which national public finance policy is influenced by
the benefit, rather than the ability-to-pay principle of distributional
equity.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we use the U.S and Swedish experiences with
privately funded infrastructure to support our argument that this type
of funding is more likely to occur in those public finance policy
contexts characterized by a relatively strong commitment to the benefit
principle and less likely to occur in those contexts characterized by a
relatively strong commitment to the ability-to-pay principle.2 In
Chapter 3, we provide conceptual and empirical descriptions of three
basic techniques used to allocate private funds to infrastructure
capital investments in the United States--special assessment financing,
exactions, and development fees. In Chapter 4, we provide a conceptual
and empirical description of a technique by which private funds have
been made available for the capital investment costs of infrastructure
in Sweden.
One of the results of our comparison of the use of private funds
for infrastructure in the United States and Sweden is the finding that,
in recent years, private funds appear to have been used more often to
finance infrastructure in the United States than in Sweden. We will use
this observation to support our argument, presented initially in Chapter
2 and developed further in Chapter 5, that the use of private funds for
infrastructure projects correlates with the extent to which public
2In Appendix 1, we describe the way in which we collected the data.
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finance policy is influenced by the benefit principle of distributional
equity, and that private funds are less likely to be used to finance
infrastructure to the extent that public finance policy is influenced by
the ability-to-pay principle. We will also cite briefly some of the
other factors that we have found, on the basis of our understanding of
recent privatization efforts in the United States and Sweden, that shape
the policy approach to the market's failure to allocate efficiently the
resources required for the provision of infrastructure, and, in
particular, that determine the extent to which private financial
resources are allocated to infrastructure projects.
CHAPTER 2
A THEORETICAL CONTEXT
FOR INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE
In most countries, the majority of transportation infrastructure
is publicly financed. Historically, the chief theoretical justification
for this practice has been the market's failure to allocate efficiently
the financial resources required for infrastructure provision.
According to this perspective, private markets allocate too few
financial resources to the production of transportation infrastructure.
There is, however, a relatively recent theoretical perspective in which
the position is taken that markets can, indeed, allocate the financial
resources required for the production of transportation infrastructure
as long as the ownership rights to the resources are privately held.
In this chapter, we juxtapose the two perspectives- -the theory of
market failure and the theory of property rights. The theories have not
been used to study the specific issue of financing transportation
infrastructure. Analysts have used them to investigate the more general
issue of market failure and within that context the provision (of which
finance is a an element) of infrastructure (of which transportation
facilities and services are a part). We will show that although the
theories are used to study the same empirically observed problem--market
inefficiencies--and seek the same objective- -economically efficient
resource allocation, they prescribe very different corrective policies.
According to the theory of market failure, market inefficiencies are
best overcome through government intervention into--regulation and, in
some cases, complete undertaking of--those social and economic
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activities that markets perform poorly. Within the context of
infrastructure finance, the theory implies that efficient provision of
infrastructure is best achieved when the facilities are publicly
financed. This is the policy approach traditionally adopted in the
provision of infrastructure in most nations. Alternatively, the theory
of property rights prescribes a policy of (re)structuring the ownership
rights to resources so that they are privately held, thereby, creating
the behavioral incentives that encourage market efficiency. Within the
context of infrastructure finance, this theory implies that efficient
provision of infrastructure is best achieved when the ownership rights
to the financial resources invested are privately held. This is the
policy approach increasingly adopted by governments facing constraints
on their abilities to generate public financial resources required for
the provision of infrastructure. In the following discussion, we will
present the basic arguments of the two theories and their policy
prescriptions.
Theory of Market Failure
The theory of market failure is a prominent intellectual response
to the empirically observed inefficiencies of market functions, and it
serves as the chief theoretical justification for the extensive
government intervention in the provision of infrastructure.3 According
to the neoclassical theory of perfectly competitive markets, given a set
3The material presented in this section is based primarily on our
synthesis of the discussions of market failure in Boadway (1979), Samuelson
(1969), Brown and Jackson (1980), and Tresch (1981).
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of specific antecedent assumptions, markets produce Pareto-efficient
resource allocations.4 There are two categories of such assumptions--
market assumptions and technical assumptions (Tresch, 1981, p. 7).
Market assumptions are necessary to assure that markets are perfectly
competitive--that all market transactors are price takers. They include
(1) large numbers of buyers and sellers, (2) no product differentiation,
(3) complete buyer and seller access to all market information, (4)
freedom of market entry and exit, and (5) rational, utility (profit)
maximizing individuals (firms).
The technical assumptions are necessary to assure that
consumption and production functions are "well behaved" -- that
competitive markets are technically capable of producing Pareto-optimal
resource allocations. They include (1) convex preferences, (2) convex
consumption possibilities, (3) continuous preferences, (4) autonomously
determined individual utility (on the basis of own consumption and
factor supplies), (5) autonomously determined firm production
possibilities (on the basis of own inputs and outputs), and (6) convex
aggregate production possibilities. The assumptions that preferences
and consumption possibilities are convex and that preferences are
continuous satisfy the efficiency condition that individual utility
functions exhibit diminishing returns. The assumptions that individual
utility and firm production possibilities are autonomously determined
4An allocation of resources is Pareto efficient if there exists no
alternative allocation that improves the welfare of one economic agent without
simultaneously reducing that of another.
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satisfy the efficiency condition that there be no consumption or
production externalities. The assumption that production possibilities
are convex satisfies the efficiency condition that there be constant or
increasing opportunity costs or that firm production functions exhibit
constant or decreasing returns to scale. It precludes increasing
returns to scale (or decreasing opportunity costs) in production.
In reality, market and technical assumptions are frequently
invalid, and markets, therefore, frequently fail to allocate resources
efficiently. Francis Bator (1961, p. 100) found that roughly 97 percent
of all U.S. federal government expenditures could be justified on the
basis of market failure resulting from the violations of just three
technical assumptions--convex aggregate production possibilities,
autonomously determined individual utility, and autonomously determined
firm production possibilities. In other words, increasing returns-to-
scale production and the emergence of consumption or production or both
types of externalities constitute chief causes of market failure and,
thereby, provide the principle theoretical justification for almost all
U. S. federal government expenditures. In the sections that follow, we
describe the relationships between increasing returns to scale and
externalities, on the one hand, and market failure on the other.
Increasing Returns-to-Scale
Markets that fail to allocate resources required in production
processes efficiently are characterized by increasing returns-to-scale,
which, in turn, are, typically, exhibited in production processes that
are characterized by indivisibilities. The cost structures of such
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production processes are such that start-up costs are high and marginal
production costs are comparatively low so as the scale of production
increases, per unit production costs decrease, and per unit returns
increase. Increases in returns-to-scale can be significant enough to
enable a single production unit to accommodate all of the market demand
for its product type. Thus, increasing returns-to-scale is a
manifestation of the violation of the technical assumption that
aggregate production possibilities are convex.
Thus, one reason why increasing returns-to-scale production
generates market failure is that its most efficient industrial
structure--monopolistic or oligopolistic--is not the industrial
structure required for market efficiency--competitive. Under conditions
of increasing returns-to-scale, because per unit production costs
decrease as output expands, large firms can produce more output at lower
costs--that is, be more efficient--than small firms. Therefore,
efficient increasing returns-to-scale production requires that all of
the output required to satisfy market demand for a specific product type
be produced by a single or a few production units rather than many small
competitive units.5
Another reason why increasing returns-to-scale production
generates market failure is that, in their quest to maximize profits,
market producers price the output from such production processes
5The superior efficiency of large production units in production
processes characterized by increasing returns-to-scale is derived from their
ability to produce further along their continuously declining average cost
curves than smaller production units can. This means they can produce more
output at lower average costs.
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inefficiently. The efficient pricing rule dictates that marginal
revenue be equated to marginal production costs. Under increasing
returns-to-scale production, because marginal production costs decline
as output expands, marginal costs must, by definition, be less than
average costs. The efficient price--one that is equal to marginal
costs--must, therefore, be less than average costs; consequently, losses
are incurred. Rather than price their output efficiently and incur the
inevitable losses, market producers price their output inefficiently--at
that point on their average revenue curves that corresponds vertically
to the intersection of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves.
Consequently, their pricing rule results in higher prices than the
efficient pricing rule. In addition to inefficiently high prices,
market producers produce inefficiently low levels of output because they
determine output also on the basis of that point on their average
revenue curves that corresponds vertically to the intersection of the
marginal revenue and marginal cost curves. The resulting output is
lower than the efficient level of output which is determined precisely
at the point at which marginal revenue and marginal cost equate.
Given how market producers behave, according to the market
failure theory, if society is to enjoy the efficiency benefits that can
be derived from increasing returns-to-scale production, i.e., low prices
and ample output, the government, and not private markets, should
allocate the required resources.
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Externalities
The presence of consumption and production externalities
constitutes another important source of market failure. Externalities
are unpriced effects- -benefits and costs--that emanate from and are
external to market activities. They emerge when it is technically,
financially, legally, and/or politically infeasible (or impossible) to
establish unambiguously defined, allocated, and enforced property rights
to all market effects. Externalities are effects that cannot be
internalized through the existing market structure. One consequence of
the emergence of externalities is that the consumption or production, or
both types of activities conducted by some economic agents enters and
frequently alters the consumption and/or production activities of other
economic agents. Thus, the existence of externalities is a
manifestation of the violation of the technical market efficiency
assumptions that individual utility and firm production possibilities
are autonomously determined.
In our investigation of the issue, we found that most analyses of
externalities focus on divergences between social and private costs and
benefits. In our view, such a focus constitutes a relatively
superficial approach to the analysis as externalities. At the most
profound level, externalities are a function of property rights
structures. We maintain, therefore, that externalities are more
appropriately understood within the context of the structure of property
rights underlying market exchanges. Our discussion of externalities
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will, therefore, focus on property rights structures rather than
divergences between social and private costs and benefits.
Property rights are the rights to the use, income, and transfer
(sale) of property (resources).6 There are three idealized property
rights structures--private, communal, and state. Each structure grants
property owners the exclusive right to the use of their property, to the
income it generates, and to the voluntary transfer of ownership. Thus,
private property rights grant property owners exclusive rights to the
use, income, and transfer of their privately owned property; communal
property rights grant community members exclusive rights to the use,
income, and transfer of communally owned property; and state property
rights grant the state exclusive rights to the use, income, and transfer
of state property.7
Each property-rights structure creates behavioral incentives that
have different implications for market efficiency. In general, private
property rights create incentives that encourage market efficiency, and
communal and state property rights create incentives that discourage
market efficiency. Communal property rights are particularly
problematic with regard to market efficiency, because the owners of such
6 This discussion is based primarily on Coase (1960), Demsetz (1967), and
Alchian and Demsetz (1973).
7Communal property rights are often confused with state property rights.
There is a difference, however, that is a function of the degree to which the
exclusivity of state property rights are enforced. When they are not strictly
enforced, as in the case of state owned parks, the property rights are more
communal than state. In such cases, no individual can be excluded from the
use of the property (except through prior and continuing use). If the
exclusivity of state property rights is strictly enforced, as in the case of
military installations, the property rights are, in fact, state.
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rights have little incentive to consider all of the effects emanating
from the decisions they make regarding the allocation (or use) of their
property. This is because when property is communally owned, it is
often infeasible or impossible for individual owners (community members)
to internalize (bear) all of the effects emanating from their property
allocation decisions. Because the property is communally owned, the
effects are shared with other community members. Consequently,
individual community members have little incentive to measure accurately
all of the costs and benefits of their property-allocation decisions and
to incorporate such costs and benefits into their decision-making
processes so as to ensure the maximum efficient use of their property.
The incentives and consequent efficiency results of private
property- rights structures are precisely the opposite of those that
arise under communal property-rights structures. Markets can be
characterized as arenas in which property rights are exchanged.
Markets' property allocations are most efficient when the rights to the
property exchanged therein are held privately. The more precisely
defined, allocated, and strictly enforced property rights are (the more
private they are), the more completely property owners internalize the
consequences of property-allocation decisions and the higher the
correlation between the property owner's welfare and the effects
emanating from such decisions. Under these circumstances, property
owners have considerable incentive to analyze all property-allocation
decisions in terms of their possible effects, to capitalize fully those
effects into the present transfer (market exchange) value of their
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property, and to ensure that the effects maximize that value. As a
consequence of these behavioral incentives, private property tends to be
allocated efficiently.
Frequently, reality falls short of the theoretical ideal. High
market transaction costs8 often preclude the establishment of
unambiguously defined, well-allocated, and strictly enforced private
property rights. To the extent that this is the case, property owners
do not have exclusive rights to the use, income, or transfer of their
property, and they cannot fully internalize the effects of their
property-allocation decisions. Incomplete internalization of effects
and the consequent emergence of externalities obscures the relationship
between the welfare of property owners and property-allocation
decisions. Consequently, property owners have little incentive to
consider all of the effects of such decisions and, therefore, cannot
fully capitalize all such effects into the market value of their
property and cannot ensure that their property is allocated to its value
maximizing or most efficient use.
In the public-finance literature, the classic externality is the
public good. Public goods are illustrative of a particular category of
externalities--consumption externalities. They are frequently referred
to as jointly consumed goods--goods the consumption of which is
nonexclusive; that is, no one can be excluded from their consumption.
Their nonexclusivity results from the financial, technical, legal,
8Market transactions costs are the costs of acquiring information,
negotiating, policing, and enforcing contracts required for market exchanges.
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and/or political impossibility or infeasibility of establishing
unambiguous, well-defined, allocated, and enforced property rights to
their consumption; private property rights cannot be established for
nonexclusive or public goods. Thus, if a public good is made available
for the consumption of one individual, it is necessarily available for
everyone's consumption.
The nonexclusivity of public goods gives rise to the free rider
and consumption preference revelation problems, which, ultimately,
generate market failure. Unlike private goods--goods for which the
rights of consumption are exclusive--the consumption of nonexclusive
goods is not contingent upon payment. Therefore, some individuals take
free rides: they consume the nonexclusive good without paying its
producers a price that reflects their (the free riding consumers) true
marginal valuation of consumption of the good. This they do with the
knowledge that, in spite of their submarginal payments, they cannot be
easily excluded from consumption of the good and on the expectation that
their consumption will be financed (in part or in full) out of payments
made by others. If a nonexclusive good falls prey to many free riders--
individuals who fail to reveal correctly the marginal valuation of their
consumption--the price mechanism transmits faulty consumer preferences
to market producers, who then may make erroneous resource allocation
decisions. Relative to true consumer preferences and all of the
benefits that consumers derive from the consumption of nonexclusive
goods, market producers, therefore, allocate too few resources toward
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their production.9 Because there is no reasonably effective means of
excluding individuals from the consumption of nonexclusive goods and,
therefore, of charging a profit-maximizing price, market producers have
no incentive to allocate the efficient level of resources toward the
production of public goods. The lack of an effective voluntary
procedure or mechanism for consumer preference revelation is the chief
source of the market's failure to allocate efficiently the resources for
the production of public goods. 1 0 It is also the chief justification
for their provision by the government rather than private markets.
Frequently, the consumption of public goods is also (but not
necessarily) characterized by nonrivalry. Consumption of a good is
nonrival when its marginal cost of consumption is zero; that is, when
the marginal consumer adds nothing to the good's variable costs of
production."i Efficiency dictates that price be equated to marginal
cost. When consumption is nonrival and marginal production costs are
zero, the efficient price is also zero; to charge a price greater than
zero is inefficient because welfare can be enhanced through incremental
increases in consumption at no extra costs. Therefore, to price
nonrival consumption goods, and, thereby, exclude some individuals from
9In the absence of nonexclusivity or consumption externalities, true
consumer preferences and the consumption benefits that consumers derive from
public goods would be reflected in payments that equal their true marginal
valuation of such goods.
1oWhen exclusion is possible, prices serve this purpose.
iiIndivisibilities result in zero marginal production costs. When the
production of a good is characterized by large capital investment costs and
-negligible marginal production or service delivery costs, the marginal cost of
production in effect, may be zero.
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consumption when the social welfare can be enhanced through addition
consumption at no extra cost is inefficient. 12 Profit-maximizing market
producers do not charge zero prices; market prices are always greater
than zero. Furthermore, by charging prices for nonrival goods, market
producers effectively exclude some consumers from their consumption and,
thereby, reduce effective demand for the goods. The low effective
demand induces market producers to allocate fewer resources toward the
production of nonrival goods than would be the case if all welfare-
enhancing consumption was allowed; consequently, markets produce an
inefficiently low amount of nonrival goods. The inefficiencies that
arise from the pricing of nonrival consumption goods is another reason
why many public goods are provided by the government rather than private
markets.
Increasing Returns-to-Scale, Externalities, and
Transportation Infrastructure Finance Policy
Many forms of transportation infrastructure are characterized by
increasing returns-to-scale and/or production and consumption
externalities; therefore, the provision--finance, design, construction,
operation, and maintenance--of such facilities is almost always
undertaken by governments rather than the private sector. The
production of most transportation infrastructure--airports, public
12The inefficiency implicit in market pricing of nonrival goods is
intuitively evident when we consider that if the marginal consumer imparts no
effect on the consumption of other consumers (i.e., there are no opportunity
costs associated with incremental increases in consumption), restricting
welfare-enhancing consumption through positive pricing (or any other rationing
device) is economically inefficient.
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transit, roadways, and harbor facilities--is indivisible. Their
production processes exhibit increasing returns-to-scale, and,
consequently, they are most efficiently produced by monopolistic and/or
oligopolistic production units. This is because small competitive
market production units are technically incapable of maximum efficiency
in the production of most transportation infrastructure. Furthermore,
if consumers are to enjoy the efficiency benefits of marginal cost
pricing of increasing-returns-to-scale production (lowest prices and
highest output), the provision, including finance, of transportation
infrastructure should not be left to market producers who cannot
withstand the inevitable losses. The inefficiently high prices and low
output of market provision of goods and services characterized by
increasing returns-to-scale production serves as a principle
justification for government, rather than private market, financing of
most transportation facilities and services.
Another justification for government financing of most
transportation infrastructure is that many of such facilities exhibit
public-good qualities; frequently, they emit consumption externalities.
Highways and harbor facilities are good examples of the difficulty and
expense of erecting exclusionary devices that would be required to
restrict the consumption of some transport facilities. Furthermore,
many transport facilities are nonrival in consumption so that exclusion,
even if possible, would be inefficient (because social and economic
welfare can be enhanced through additional consumption at no extra
cost). Because market efficiency requires exclusion (to enable the
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functioning of the price mechanism), market producers are not the most
efficient providers of transportation infrastructure; because they
cannot or should not exclude individuals from consumption of nonrival
goods and services, they allocate an inefficiently low amount of
financial and other resources required for the provision of such output.
In recent years, the fiscal realities faced by many governments
have exposed important weaknesses in the policy of government
intervention into market activities that is prescribed under the theory
of market failure. In particular, it is clear that such a policy is
increasingly subject to severe financial constraints; frequently,
governments do not have the financial resources required to implement
such a policy. Thus, the practical utility of the theory and its policy
recommendation has eroded in recent years. In response, the policy of
privatization--the use of private financial and other resources in the
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of infrastructure and
other traditionally public output--has emerged. Its intellectual basis
is the theory of property rights which is described in the discussion
that follows.
Theory of Property Rights
Dissatisfaction with the neoclassical theory of markets has
provoked its revision by numerous analysts seeking to improve its
ability to explain and to predict empirically-observed market
activities. 13 One general line of revision is based on an extension of
13The information provided in this section is based largely on Coase
(1960), Demsetz (1967), Alchian and Demsetz (1973), and DeAlessi (1983).
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the utility-maximizing hypothesis to all individual choices under
constraints--institutional, natural, and state of the art. One of the
perspectives in this general line of revision is the theory of property
rights; analysts use it to study what is considered to be an important
institutional constraint to market efficiency--the underlying structure
of property rights.
According to this perspective, different structures of property
rights create different economic behavioral incentives, which, in turn,
result in different resource allocations and efficiency effects. Market
efficiency requires (in addition to the well-established market and
technical assumptions) unambiguously defined, allocated, and strictly
enforced private property rights and zero transactions costs (the cost
of transacting in, exchanging, or restructuring property rights).
Private property rights are necessary to ensure that all of the effects
emanating from property allocation decisions are internalized by
property owners who, consequently, for the sake of personal welfare, are
encouraged to ensure that all such decisions are property-value
maximizing--that property is used in the most efficient manner. Zero
transactions costs are necessary to facilitate any restructuring,
reallocation, exchange or transfer of property rights that might be
necessary to ensure that they are privately held. According to the
theory, to the extent that private property rights are attenuated (e.g.,
by government regulation), replaced by some other institutional
arrangement (e.g., public or communal ownership), or are for some other
reason ambiguously defined, poorly allocated, or weakly enforced, and to
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the extent that positive transactions costs obstruct corrective
restructuring, some of the effects emanating from property-allocation
decisions may not be internalized by property owners, and their
incentives to ensure the efficiency of such decisions may be reduced.
Under these circumstances, property is likely to be allocated
inefficiently.
Pioneers in the development of the property-rights theory, such
as Demsetz and Alchian, provided us with some of the earliest insights
into its empirical significance. For instance, they used the theory to
improve our understanding of the structure and economic behavior of the
private business enterprise. In a 1967 article, entitled "Toward a
Theory of Property Rights," Demsetz used the theory to analyze the
structure and economic behavior of publicly held corporations. 14 The
article is particularly instructive as to the concept of property
rights, the role of property rights in social systems, and some of the
catalytic forces underlying their emergence. The most important
contribution to emerge out of the analysis is his setting forth of some
basic principles relevant to the evolution or "coalescence" of property
rights and to the determination of ownership structures (pp. 354-359).
Demsetz begins his analysis with the assertion that communal
structures of property rights result in inefficient resource
allocations. He uses land as an example. Communal property rights to
land do not concentrate the benefits and costs emanating from land-
14Corporations that are financed through the public's purchases of stock
and equity.
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allocation decisions; such costs and benefits are not internalized by
individual land owners, but rather by the community as a whole. 1 5 Thus,
any individual land-owner's (individual community member's) allocation
decisions necessarily create externalities--external effects that are
not incorporated into his or her allocation decisions and that reduce
his or her incentives to use communal property efficiently. Individual
land owners will tend, for instance, to overutilize the land and to use
it in others ways that appear to maximize their individual welfare.'6
As a consequence of all such individual actions, the overall efficiency
of the land and benefits derived out of its use are reduced.
Theoretically, the problem of inefficient use of communally owned
land may be overcome through a voluntary restriction of communal
property rights--a mutual agreement among land owners not to overutilize
the land and to use it in the most efficient manner. There are,
however, practical limitations to the utility of this solution. A
voluntary restriction of communal property rights requires every
community member to restrict, at will, their use of the land. The costs
of negotiating and policing (market transactions costs) such
restrictions would be high. Moreover, the larger the community, the
greater the transactions costs because the incentives and opportunities
to breach the agreed-upon restrictions would be greater.
15The costs associated with individual land-owner's allocation decisions
are not borne by him or her alone, but by the entire community; and the
benefits derived from individual land-owner's allocation decisions are not
reaped by him or her alone, but by the entire community.
161n fact, if each individual operates in this fashion everyone's welfare
is reduced relative to its potential.
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Another solution to the problem of inefficient use of communally
owned land would be to parcel the land into privately owned plots; that
is, to restructure property rights to the land so that individual land
owners are forced to internalize more of the effects emanating from
their land-allocation decisions and are, thereby, encouraged to make use
of their land in the most efficient manner. Any remaining
externalities--the effects that any one individual property owner might
have on another--may be internalized through less costly transactions
among those individuals. 17
Two market options are available to private property owners
seeking to transact the internalization of externalities; they are
contractual agreements among land owners and land buyouts (i.e., the
coalescence or bundling of property rights). Both options essentially
involve the restructuring of property rights. The decision to select
one option or the other is made on the basis of their relative expenses,
which is a function of scale economies and market transactions costs.
If there are constant returns to scale in land operations (i.e., returns
are constant irrespective of the size of land parcels), and if the
transactions costs of internalizing externalities is low, then it is a
matter of indifference which option is selected. To the extent,
however, that transactions costs are high (i.e., the costs of
transacting in the property rights to external effects through existing
17Externalities that accompany private land ownership do not affect all
land owners, and, in general, it will be necessary for only a few owners to
transact the internalization of such external effects. The cost of such
transactions will generally be less than the costs of transactions among many
communal property owners.
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market structures is high), then the externalities are more likely to be
internalized through an outright purchase of the land. For a given
level of transactions costs, to the extent there are diseconomies of
scale in land operations, contractual agreements will be used to
internalize externalities; to the extent that there are economies of
scale in land operations, outright purchases will be used to internalize
externalities. The basic principle established by Demsetz is that in
selecting a method by which the rights to property are restructured so
that externalities can be internalized, contract costs must be compared
to the costs associated with scale of operation. The rights to property
will tend to coalesce, or be owned, in sizes that minimize the sum of
these costs.
In an analysis of the structure of property rights, Demsetz
applies this principle to publicly held corporations. He bases his
analysis on two assumptions: (1) that there are significant economies of
scale in the operation of large corporations, and (2) the acquisition of
equity capital is less costly when acquired from many small
contributors. In his analysis, he explains why the property rights to
publicly held corporate assets are structured as they are--to ensure the
complete internalization of externalities and, thereby, ensure the most
efficient allocation of corporate assets.
The purchasers of corporate equity essentially own the property
rights to corporate assets. As the owners of the assets, they are
technically entitled to participate in all decisions regarding the
assets' use. If, however, they were, in fact, to participate in all
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such decisions, the costs of operating the corporation would quickly
exceed the benefits of large-scale operation. In order to avoid
(inefficiently) high operating costs, the owners of corporate assets
make the first of three legal modifications to the structure of the
property rights to the assets. A small (relative to the number of
equity owners) corporate management control team is appointed by the
equity owners to be the assets' de facto owners. This modification, in
effect, reduces the corporate operations costs relative to what they
would be if all equity owners were to participate in decisions regarding
the allocation of the corporate assets. This coalescence of property
rights is analogous, in effect, to the coalescing of communal property
rights around privately owned lots. It reduces the emergence of
externalities (external effects that emerge from the actions and
decisions of individual equity owners, which, together, increase
corporate operating costs), and it reduces the transactions costs of
internalizing any externalities that remain (contractual agreements need
only be reached among a small team, with the result that negotiations
and policing costs are lower).
This structure of property rights, itself, poses externality
problems. For instance, should the corporation fail (in the United
States) partnership law requires each shareholder (those who own equity
in the corporation) to honor corporate debts up to the limit of his/her
financial ability. Thus, the activities and decisions of the de facto
managerial owners can have significant economic effects on corporate
shareholders. Left unchanged, under managerial de facto ownership
- 39 -
structure, corporate managers do not internalize the effects of their
decisions; they do not bear all the costs of bad management decisions;
and they do not reap all the economic benefits of good management
decisions. Consequently, they have little incentive to avoid costly
corporate asset management decisions and to make beneficial decisions.
Furthermore, investors' fear of the liabilities that they might be
forced to bear as a result of bad management decisions induces them to
require a higher return (commensurate with their perceived risk) on
their equity capital, thus, increasing the costs of raising corporate
capital. To avoid the externality effect of managerial de facto
ownership and the consequent increases in corporate capital costs, the
owners of corporate assets make a second legal modification to the
structure of property rights to corporate assets; they establish limited
liability. Limited liability restricts the corporate liability of
shareholders. It also forces management to internalize some of the
effects of its asset allocation decisions.
A third legal modification in the structure of corporate property
rights that further reduces externality effects of management decisions
on shareholders is the establishment of the right of shareholders to
transfer their corporate interests without having to obtain permission
from other shareholders and without having to dissolve the corporation.
This modification makes it easier for individual shareholders to
relinquish ownership in a corporation in which management preferences,
actions, and decisions are inconsistent with their own. It helps, too,
to maintain harmony between management and shareholders.
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Demsetz's analysis of the property rights of public corporations
yields two important points. First, because costly externalities tend
to emerge from other property rights structures (notably communal),
property rights tend to coalesce in small bundles--private groups or
individuals. Second, the way in which the property rights coalesce into
these bundles depends on the relative costs of the methods by which
externalities can be internalized in markets--contracts and buyouts.
In a 1973 article, Alchian and Demsetz expand upon Demsetz's
earlier analysis of the property rights of public corporations and
contributed more to our understanding of the effects of property rights
on market efficiency. Demsetz established in his earlier work that
different structures of property rights have different efficiency
effects. Private property rights encourage market efficiency, and any
attenuation of those rights--the establishment of communal rights or
government regulation--reduces the efficiency with which resources are
allocated. In addition to the type of rights structure, Alchian and
Demsetz assert that who is the owner of the rights also has important
market efficiency implications. For instance, because public and
private owners of property rights respond to different incentives--the
former responds more favorably to political incentives and the latter
more favorably to market incentives--they are motivated to use their
property in different ways. Consequently, the efficiency with which
publicly and privately owned property is allocated is different. From
the perspective of market efficiency, to the extent that market
transactions costs are zero (so that efficiency-enhancing, property-
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rights restructuring can take place), private owners tend to allocate
property more efficiently than the public owners.
There are circumstances in which externalities emerge that can
only be internalized under the existing property-rights structures at
prohibitively high transactions costs. In such instances,
internalization requires the restructuring of property rights--a change
in the type of rights or the identity of the right's owners--so that the
transactions costs of internalizing the externalities is reduced, and
the property can be put to its most efficient use.
Alchian and Demsetz use this property-rights/transactions-costs
paradigm to explain some significant historical property-rights
adjustment processes, such as the "privatization" of American Indian
hunting lands, European and North American radio broadcast signals, and
the English land enclosures (pp. 19-26). In each case, technological or
other types of changes altered the value of what had, theretofore, been
communally owned property and caused the emergence of externalities that
could only be internalized under the existing (communal) property-rights
structure at very high transactions costs. In each case, an adjustment
in the structure of property rights was necessary to lower the market
transactions' costs of internalizing the externalities. As a result,
markets were able to allocate the property more efficiently.
The property-rights/transactions-costs paradigm has also been
used to provide insight into numerous other phenomenon including the
capital structure of large corporations, the choice and evolution of
different forms of business enterprises (why do corporations exist and
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what is the logic of their internal structures), the factors that
influence the size and complexity of the modern corporation (why are
firms in different industries characterized by different sizes and
business organizations) (DeAlessi, 1983). Finally (and most relevant to
this thesis), the property-rights/transactions-costs paradigm has been
used to provide greater insights into bureaucratic decision making and
behavior (DeAlessi, 1983; Hanke, 1984).
We have already established that when private property rights are
unambiguously defined, allocated, and enforced, and there are no
transactions costs associated with rights restructuring, markets
allocate property efficiently; and that, alternatively, to the extent
that private property rights are attenuated or replaced by some other
institutional arrangement, markets allocate resources inefficiently.
When, for instance, property is publicly owned, meaning that rights to
its use and income are not exclusive, its owners cannot internalize all
of the costs and benefits resulting from decisions regarding its
allocation; that is, externalities emerge. Furthermore, publicly owned
property is not transferable. It is not readily marketable and cannot
be easily traded through markets. For instance, it is not possible to
trade one's rights of ownership in a public park or national defense
(except by moving out of the jurisdiction in which the park is located
or out of the country). Thus, for public property, the transactions
costs of market exchanges in the property rights are often prohibitively
high. The lack of exclusive rights to the use and income of public
property and the inability to transfer those rights provides little
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incentive to the owners of public property to analyze property
allocation decisions in terms of their effects on property values and to
capitalize those effects into property values to ensure the maximum use
value of the property. The owners of public property, essentially, have
a limited incentive to ensure that their property is used efficiently;
consequently, they take little interest in monitoring the actions and
decisions of those, i.e., public bureaucrats, who actually allocate or
determine the use of public property.
Public bureaucrats allocate property, the ownership rights to
which belong to some amorphous and obscure body called the public--a
body that often does not monitor their property managers very carefully.
Because public bureaucrats have no private or personal rights of
ownership to the public property they manage, they do not internalize
the costs associated with bad management decisions, nor do they
internalize the benefits resulting from good management decisions.
They, therefore, have little incentive to make allocation decisions that
maximize the efficient use of the property. Combined with the fact
that, frequently, the owners of public property (taxpayers) do not
monitor bureaucratic decisions and actions, bureaucrats might be
encouraged to shirk their public property management responsibilities
and to engage in various forms of opportunistic behavior--to allocate
public property in ways that maximize their utility and welfare at the
expense of the utility and welfare of the public property owner. They
are likely, for instance, to seek job-related perquisites, which
increase production or service provision costs. They are less likely to
- 44 -
introduce cost-reducing innovations or input combinations, to be
responsive to consumer demands, to use less capital-intensive production
techniques or, in general, to make any efficiency-enhancing changes that
might threaten their jobs or management control over public resources.
Because bureaucrats manage property that they do not own and because
they are not effectively monitored by the property owners, they allocate
such property inefficiently relative to their private counterparts who
manage private property and who are, therefore, monitored closely by the
property owners. (DeAlessi, 1983, pp. 64-81)
Hanke (1984) has used the property rights/transactions costs
analysis of bureaucratic behavior and decision making as the theoretical
basis for a public policy of privatization of infrastructure and other
traditionally publicly provided services and facilities. In a 1984
report submitted to the United States Agency for International
Development, Hanke argues that because resources tend to be allocated
more efficiently under private property rights structures, the
efficiency with which public works infrastructure is provided could be
improved to the extent that the ownership rights to the resources
required for the provision of such facilities and services are
restructured so that they are privately held. According to Hanke,
...the nature of the rights to the use of resources, to
the income they generate and to the transferability of
those resources to others has an effect on the way the
resources are used. Property rights arrangements.. .are
not neutral. The system of property rights that accompany
different organizational arrangements determines through
actual or imputed prices, how the costs and benefits
resulting from individual decisions will be allocated to
decisions makers and others (1984, p.9).
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Thus, under a structure of unambiguously defined, well-allocated,
and strictly enforced private property rights, property owners
internalize all effects emanating from property-allocation decisions and
discern clearly the relationship between their welfare and property
allocation. They, therefore, have a considerable incentive to engage in
those activities that ensure the most efficient use of their property--
to monitor and analyze property allocation decisions, to capitalize all
ensuing effects into property values, and to ensure that the effects
maximize those values. Any attenuation of private property-rights
structures, such as those caused by high market transactions costs that
preclude exclusive internalization of property-allocation effects and
reduce the transferability of ownership rights, obscures the
relationship between owner welfare and property usage, and reduces the
behavioral incentives to ensure efficient property allocation. There is
less incentive to monitor property-allocation decisions and to ensure
that they are efficient and value maximizing; consequently, property is
allocated less efficiently.
This inefficiency problem Hanke claims is best overcome through a
restructuring of behavioral incentives that comes with a restructuring
of property rights. Specifically, by restructuring rights so that the
market transactions costs of internalizing property-allocation effects
and of transferring property-ownership rights is reduced (thereby making
such activities possible), property owners are provided with greater
incentives to engage in those activities--monitoring and capitalizing
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all effects into asset values--that ensure efficient property
allocations.
Hanke cites empirical evidence from over 30 categories of "so-
called" public infrastructure and services, including ports, streets,
and urban transit, that suggests that private supply (the establishment
of private property rights to infrastructure inputs) is more cost
effective (i.e, efficient) than public supply (pp. 26-78). He asserts
that, in addition to the theoretical support provided by the property-
rights/transactions-costs paradigm, this evidence provides strong
empirical support for a policy of infrastructure privatization.
According to Hanke
... If our objective is to attain economic efficiency.. .we
should not rely on market socialist reforms.. .without
changing property rights arrangements and thereby the
incentives faced by the public sector managers and
employees, we cannot expect their behavior to approach
that which would be consistent with maximizing the present
value of the public enterprise's assets. If we desire to
improve efficiency.. .we must adopt privatization policies.
In particular, we (should) focus our attention on those
privatization possibilities that concern the supply of so-
called public infrastructure and services.. .(p. 13-14).
In traditional public finance literature, the presence of
externalities is a principle theoretical justification for public
provision of many types of infrastructure. Hanke diminishes the
significance of this "alleged problem" by establishing a distinction
between public and private supply and finance. Infrastructure may be
privately or publicly supplied; furthermore, that supply, whether
private or public, may be publicly or privately financed. Thus, any
good or service, including those that create externalities, may be
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privately supplied and publicly financed. Such an arrangement affords
the superior efficiencies of private supply without the supplier having
to bear the financial losses typically associated with the efficient
provision of externality-emitting output. It enables consumers to reap
a dual set of, otherwise, mutually exclusive benefits--the cost and
other production efficiencies available as a result of private supply,
and the optimal pricing and output available as a result of public
finance. On the basis of this argument, Hanke advocates an
infrastructure provision policy that combines private supply and public
finance as the most efficient means of providing infrastructure. This
policy has important and useful implications for the problem of public
sector fiscal constraints on infrastructure provision processes. To the
extent that private suppliers can be more efficient than public
suppliers, the cost of such a policy to the public sector is lower than
the cost of traditional policy, and, thereby, helps to relieve the
problem of fiscally constrained infrastructure provision.
Hanke also takes issue with the traditional theoretical argument
that increasing returns-to-scale is a justification for public provision
of infrastructure. On the basis of work completed by Demsetz in 1968,
Hanke argues that even in the case of natural monopolies, efficient
resource allocations can be achieved, for instance, through competitive
bidding for the private (exclusive and transferable) property rights to
regional franchises. Competitive bidding can help to reduce the
inefficiencies--high prices and low output--that can arise in natural
monopolies; and the establishment of private property rights to the
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inputs can help to reduce the inefficiencies that arise under public
rights structures. Combined, they allow the consumers of infrastructure
to enjoy the cost and output benefits of increasing returns-to-scale
production.
We note that among property-rights analysts, Hanke originally
represented an extreme. In their applications of the theory, few
analysts have used it as the intellectual basis for a policy of the
privatization of infrastructure and other facilities and services that
have traditionally been provided by the public sector. Nevertheless,
Hanke's application of the property rights theory is important because
it does serves a principle theoretical basis for privatization policy.
Property Rights and Transportation
Infrastructure Finance Policy
The theory of property rights has emerged in recent years as the
intellectual basis of an alternative policy response to the failure of
markets to allocate the resources required for the provision of
transportation infrastructure efficiently. Accordingly, market
efficiency requires that the ownership rights to the requisite resources
be privately held. Analysts argue that the economic behavioral
incentives created under private property-rights structures encourage
the efficient allocation of the financial and other resources. Thus, if
the financial resources required for the provision of transportation
infrastructure are to be allocated efficiently, the property rights to
them must be privately held. According to this perspective, the
investment of private funds helps to ensure efficient market provision
- 49 -
of transportation infrastructure. Like the market failure theory, this
perspective has weaknesses resulting from its implicit neglect of some
of the realities of infrastructure provision, such as the political,
legislative, social, etc. barriers to the establishment of private
property rights to certain resources.
Critique
In the preceding discussion, we have shown that the theories of
market failure and property rights are used by analysts to study the
same empirically observed problem--the inefficiency with which markets
allocate some resources--and to seek the same objective--an economically
efficient allocation of productive resources. We have also shown that
they serve as the intellectual basis of opposing policy approaches to
the problem of economically inefficient market allocation of financial
and other resources required in the provision of infrastructure. The
theory of market failure serves as the basis of a policy of government
finance of the provision of transportation infrastructure, and the
theory of property rights provides the justification for a policy of
private finance (establishing private property rights to the financial
resources) of the provision of transportation infrastructure.
One point that does not clearly emerge from the theoretical
discussion is that the decision to implement a policy solution to the
problem of market failure is not made in a vacuum. The decision will
always be influenced by the public finance policy context is which it is
made; consequently, the decision to finance infrastructure publicly or
privately, or some combination of both, will be influenced by various
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economic, political, legislative, administrative, and institutional
factors. For instance, one of our major conclusions is that the extent
to which private (rather than public) funds are allocated to
infrastructure projects will depend, in large part, on the
distributional objectives and underlying principles of the public
finance policy of the implementing body. This is because the theories
of market failure and property rights and their respective policy
resolutions are consistent with two very different distributional
principles--the ability-to-pay and the benefit principle.
Under the benefit principle, individuals contribute to the costs
of infrastructure on the basis of the benefits they receive from use of
the facilities and services. Because they pay only for that
infrastructure from which they benefit, and individual payments are tied
directly to individual consumption, there are no cross-subsidy or income
redistributional effects associated with the application of the benefit
principle. Equity, in this context, is defined as paying for what you
get. The benefit principle is the distributional principle underlying
the use of private funds for infrastructure. Recall that we have
defined private financing as financing through which costs are allocated
on the basis of benefits received, or financing in which there are no
cross-subsidy effects. Thus, private financing is not likely to be used
in those public finance policy contexts oriented toward redistribution.
Under the ability-to-pay principle, individuals contribute to the
costs of infrastructure on the basis of their ability-to-pay, which is,
typically, defined in terms of income. The higher an individual's
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income, the more that individual contributes to the cost of
infrastructure; and the lower an individual's income, the less that
individual contributes. The ability-to-pay principle is commonly used
to achieve redistributional objectives. To the extent that higher-
income individuals contribute more to the costs of infrastructure that
is available to everyone, some of their income is, in effect,
redistributed to lower-income groups. To the extent that the ability-
to-pay principle and redistributional objectives strongly influence
public-finance policy, the policy approach to market failure in the
provision of infrastructure is likely to be that prescribed under the
theory of market failure--government regulation and provision. In this
context, infrastructure is more likely to be publicly financed. It is
not likely to be privately financed because the underlying
distributional principle- -benefit principle--and its distributional
effects are inconsistent with redistributional objectives. Thus, within
the context of infrastructure finance, the policy prescribed under the
theory of property rights--market provision upon establishment of
private rights of ownership to financial resources--is most likely to be
applied in those public finance policy contexts strongly influenced by
the benefit principle of distributional equity, and not in those
contexts strongly influenced by the ability-to-pay principle and
redistributional objectives.
Distributional objectives and principles are not the only factors
likely to influence which policy approach is adopted in infrastructure
finance policy. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the use of
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private funds for infrastructure in the United States and Sweden, we
will support our argument that distributional objectives and underlying
principles of public finance policy are important determining factors,
and we will identify some other factors that shape the policy approach,
as well.
CHAPTER 3
PRIVATE FINANCING OF TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
IN THE UNITED STATES
Our aim in this chapter is to illustrate how private funds have
been used to finance transportation infrastructure in the United States
in recent years. 18 Ideally, we would couch such a discussion in the
general institutional framework for providing infrastructure in the
United States. That framework is, however, extremely heterogeneous, and
little work has been done to systematize and document it. Moreover, to
do so would constitute a thesis in itself. We have, therefore, opted to
begin the discussion, instead, with a brief description of the general
orientation of transportation infrastructure finance policy in the
United States, as documented by federal and state government authorities
and advisors of transportation policy. We will also briefly document
some of the techniques by which private funds have been used to finance
transportation services and facilities. In the second section of the
chapter, we discuss three of the techniques--special-assessment
financing, exactions, and development fees. Each has been used to
allocate infrastructure costs on the basis of the benefit principle--
strictly among beneficiaries. Finally, we conclude the chapter with an
analysis of these techniques to assess the extent to which they do, in
fact, constitute private finance and to identify some of the salient
i8A study of the role of the private sector in the provision of
infrastructure can be approached from any number of perspectives. For an
interesting study of shopping malls, see Frieden and Sagalyn (1989).
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characteristics of their distributional effects, and economic,
administrative, and legislative contexts.
The general orientation of U.S. transportation infrastructure
finance policy has been documented in reports by government agencies and
professional associations, including the United States Department of
Transportation (USDOT, 1989), the American Association of State and
Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO, 1988, 1989) and the Advisory
Committee of Highway Policy (1988). Policy statements and
recommendations contained, therein, clearly reflect a trend toward
greater private sector involvement in all aspects, including the finance
of infrastructure provision.19 In the 1988 AASHTO report, for instance,
privatization, is included among the recommended "alternative responses"
by which present and projected capital investment needs of the nations'
transportation infrastructure systems can be financed (p. 44). AASHTO
proposed that more contracting out of highway and transit maintenance
and/or service operations, and, where possible, private ownership of
such facilities and their operations could reduce existing fiscal
constraints on highway and transit investments by shifting the costs
from the public to the private sector.
19Aschauer (1990) argues, conversely, that because of the importance of
infrastructure to private capital accumulation, productivity, growth, and
ultimately, national economic productivity, growth, and international
competitiveness, government must increase its commitment to the provision of
infrastructure. The recent downward trends in public expenditures on
infrastructure has "...acted as a fiscal drag on economic activity." He
partially attributes the "falling rate of profit" in the United States to
inadequate public investment in public works facilities, including ports,
highways, and airports. Aschauer calls, therefore, for a reorientation in
public spending priorities ("restructuring of our fiscal priorities") with a
greater emphasis on public works capital.
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In a 1989 AASHTO report, private-sector participation is proposed
as a means of lowering the public costs associated with the provision of
each type of transportation infrastructure--aviation, highways, public
transit, railroads, and water transport. Emphasis is placed on the
increased use of "nontraditional" or private sources of finance (pp. 3-
6). With regard to air transport facilities, for instance,
AASHTO believes that a federal-state role that also
provides an appropriate role for local and private
participation, if properly coordinated to establish
responsibility, will produce adequate funding sources to
ensure needed system capacity (p. E-8).
With regard to rail transport facilities and service, AASHTO proposes
that they remain under the private ownership structures that have been
established in recent years as a result of structural changes that have
occurred in the rail industry (p. 4-2), and that "Whenever possible,
private investments should be used to help finance these facilities" (p.
4-7).
A 1989 USDOT report which focuses on the most important issues
and concerns that shape the framework for the development of a national
transportation policy, reflects the evolution towards greater private
sector participation in the provision of transportation. The following
issues are raised, for instance.
How should the financing responsibility be allocated among
federal, state, and local government, and the private
sector? How should public costs be allocated among users?
And to what extent could innovative financing techniques,
including developer fees, contribute? How can government
policies encourage the introduction of privately-funded,
low-density service to rural areas? Are there any
impediments imposed on private carriers by government
regulation or policies that contribute to excess costs or
otherwise hinder viable (private) service? Do tax or
other policies encourage (private sector) abandonment of
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rural transportation operations that might otherwise prove
beneficial or cost-effective? How can we encourage
entrepreneurs to form short lines where needed rail lines
might otherwise be abandoned? (p. 29)
The report concludes,
Among the factors to be considered (in the formation of
infrastructure finance policy is).. .the extent to which
the private sector can bear the costs of transportation
improvements. (p. 33)
In addition to statements made and issues raised in documents
authored by government authorities and advisors on U.S. transportation
policy, the trend toward greater private sector participation in the
financing of transportation infrastructure is also reflected in recent
innovations in financing sources and methods (United States Department
of Transportation [USDOT], 10/1983; 1/1984). For instance, private
companies have increased their participation in financing of transport
facilities and services. Private companies are now designing,
constructing, operating, maintaining, and most significantly, owning
roads and bridges, which they are allowed to finance through the
assessment of toll fees (Allen, 1989, pp. 158-159). Contracting out
various aspects of the transportation provision process is not new.
Activities, such as road and bridge construction, have been contracted
out to private firms for many years, but in recent years the use of
private contractors has been expanded to activities such as road and
bridge maintenance and repairs (Bendick, 1984, p. 153; Allen, 1989, pp.
139-152) and transit operations (USDOT, 1984, pp. R-1 through R-3;
Conant and Easton, 1987, pp. 43). There are numerous other ways in
which the financial resources of private companies have been tapped for
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transportation expenditures, including leases and sales of public real
estate and air development rights (Paris, 1983; Vogt and Cole, 1983,
pp.2, 22; Henton and Waldhorn, 1983, pp. 192-194; Schnidman and Roberts,
1985, pp.163-186; Rice Center, 1985, pp. 189-197), and donations (USDOT,
1982, pp. 0-1). It has also been suggested that the privatization of
the financing of transportation infrastructure could be accomplished
through public assumption of financing principles, guidelines, etc. that
dictate private corporate finance policy (Humplick, Livneh, and
Moavenzadeh, 1990, p. 30).
In addition to the increased use of private corporate financial
resources, increased private participation in the financing of
transportation is also reflected in recent changes in the
distributional principles underlying public finance policy.
Increasingly, private individual users of transport infrastructure are
having to pay the full economic cost of the services and facilities from
which they benefit. Beneficiary financing--developer exactions,
development (impact, user, and other) fees, and special-assessment
financing- -through which infrastructure costs are allocated exclusively
and proportionately among beneficiaries has increased in the United
States. Our focus in this study is limited to financing according to
the benefit principle, rather than financing defined in terms of the
capital structure of the financing entity; therefore, the discussion in
this chapter is limited to financing techniques by which costs are
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allocated on the basis of the distribution of benefits--developer
exactions, development fees, and special-assessment financing. 20
Developer Exactions
Developer exactions (exactions) are "in-kind" contributions to
infrastructure systems--facilities that private developers finance,
construct, and dedicate (donate) to local government. They are viewed
as a means by which private developers finance infrastructure from which
they benefit; they are intended to ensure that private developers
finance facilities required to serve their development projects, that
new development imparts a minimal impact on existing infrastructure
systems, and that the costs of infrastructure improvements required to
serve areas of new growth and development do not impart an excessive
financial burden on the users of established users of the costs of
facilities required to serve new infrastructure systems. The consensus
on the definition of exactions is weak. In some contexts, the term
refers to all developer contributions to infrastructure--in-kind and
monetary; in other instances, it refers to all contributions that are
negotiated or imposed as a condition of development. In this context,
they refer to in-kind contributions (physical facilities) that are
negotiated or imposed as a condition of development.
Exactions are closely linked to land-use control and development
regulatory processes. Generally, they are determined on the basis of
20Unless otherwise indicated, the information presented in this chapter
is based on discussions in Porter and Peiser (1984), Snyder and Stegman
(1986), and Porter, Lin, and Peiser (1987).
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environmental impact assessments that are undertaken when a new
development project is proposed. They may be negotiated or imposed as a
condition of development approvals--i.e, building permits and rezoning
authorizations--sought by private developers. Although they may be
required at any point in the development process, they are, typically,
requested at the time of subdivision and annexation approval--those
points at which cities exercise the greatest control over development
activity.
Traditionally, exactions are determined in accordance with well-
established, formally legislated standards that are clearly described in
local ordinances or in informal guidelines used by planning and public
works staff. Such exactions have been limited to highly localized
facilities, such as on-site and site-access facilities. In recent
years, however, exactions have evolved to include general facilities--
large-scale, off-site facilities that confer benefits over very large
populations. Such exactions are usually "negotiated" on a case-by-case
basis, in accordance with the needs, capabilities, limitations, etc. of
the developer and public authorities involved. There is a reluctance to
formalize negotiated exactions because of questions regarding their
legality, and the public sector's desire to keep the exactions'
negotiations process open and flexible. 21 Consequently, there are few
generally recognized guidelines in the use of negotiated exactions. One
2 Because exactions must be reasonably related to the infrastructure
needs created by their contributor, there are questions regarding the legality
of exactions of facilities that confer general benefits. The concern is that
such exactions constitute a prohibited use of contract, or conditional,
zoning.
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such guideline is that those local governments that have been granted,
by the state through zoning and subdivision enabling legislation, the
power to regulate land use and control development implicitly have the
authority to require exactions. In many states, enabling legislation
explicitly authorizes exactions of certain infrastructure necessary to
protect public health and safety. In other states, enabling legislation
grants only general powers to restrict land use in order to protect
public health and safety, and implicitly the power to require exactions.
The principle legal standard for legitimate use of negotiated
exactions is "reasonableness under due process". Accordingly,
negotiated exactions of infrastructure is legal as long as they bear a
"reasonable" relationship to the infrastructure needs created by their
contributor. (American Law Institute, 1985, p. 484) In recent years,
the specific criteria for determining reasonable relationships and,
thereby, the legitimate use of exactions is the concept of rational
nexus. Under rational nexus, exactions are legal as long as they
reflect the benefits received by their contributor. Accordingly,
infrastructure users, including private developers, can be charged the
full cost of facilities that serve their projects exclusively and a pro
rata share of the costs of facilities that serve their projects and
other development. Courts in all states, therefore, have upheld
exactions of local facilities; they have been less consistent in
upholding exactions of facilities that confer general benefits.
Essentially, under rational nexus, exactions may be required of all
beneficiaries of infrastructure in proportion to the level of benefits
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they receive from the facilities, be they on-site or off-site, large-
scale or small-scale, or whether they confer special or general
benefits. What is important to emphasize about rational nexus is that
its strict application implies no cost-sharing or cross-subsidy of
infrastructure costs. We illustrate the use of developer exactions in
the following four examples.
First, in the city of Simi Valley, California, the developers of
Wood Ranch--a 3,900-unit residential complex located on 3,000 acres of
land--have been required to provide $2.5 million worth of exactions as a
condition of development approvals. Under the terms specified in a
"development agreement", the developers must provide the following: a
4.5 mile section of an eight-lane highway, a school, fire station, dam,
40 acres of improved park land, a central communications system and
patrol vehicle for the police department, and funds for improvements in
the city hall. By committing to the exactions, the developers gained
greater assurance that their project will be executed with minimal
delays and other impediments that could arise in the development-
approval process. The commitment also provided them with a certain
amount of vested rights to complete their project without fear of
changes in policies and regulations. (Porter and Peiser, 1984, p. 10)
The second example is located in Fairfax County, Virginia, where
as a condition for requested changes in zoning regulations (from
residential to commercial) that would enable the construction of the
Fairview Park office community, two private developers--Cadillac
Fairview, Ltd. and Costain--were required to design and construct a $20
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million cloverleaf interchange at the nearby intersection of an
interstate and state highway. The exaction was deemed necessary in
order to accommodate the anticipated increases in traffic generated by
the proposed development project. Additional exactions included all of
the project's on-site infrastructure. (Cadillac-Fairview, 1984; USDOT,
1984, p. B-2 through B-3)
In a third example, also located in Fairfax County, Tyson
Developers sought changes in zoning regulations for a proposed
construction of a $100 million office complex. The changes were granted
subject to the developers finance and construction of a $3 million 4-
lane bridge deemed necessary by the local government authorities to
relieve the traffic congestion expected to be generated by their
development (USDOT, 1984, p. B-2).
The final example, located in New York City, involves a private
development group--Lincoln West Associates--that requested the rezoning
of a piece of Manhattan real estate to enable their construction of
residential/commercial complex, which they would own and operate.
Analysts who conducted an environmental impact study found that the
proposed project would increase traffic through a nearby subway station
to a level exceeding its current capacity. In exchange for the
requested rezoning approvals, the developers were required to provide a
$100 million "amenity package" of exactions of which $31.5 million went
toward the renovation of the subway station. The developer's
contribution constituted half of the expected renovation cost. (USDOT,
1984, pp. B-2 through B-2).
- 63 -
Negotiated exactions have been subject to a number of serious
criticisms that have led to their decreased use in recent years. One of
the most damaging criticisms is that they are too closely related to the
very specific needs of new development and not responsive enough to the
needs of general development processes. This is particularly true of
exactions of general facilities. Dictated by the needs of new
development, such facilities are not located in those areas or provided
at those times best suited to the needs of general development.
Furthermore, as local governments increasingly seek to hold private
developers responsible for infrastructure that for financial and legal
reasons clearly cannot be dedicated, such as very large-scale, off-site
facilities that confer general benefits over very large populations,
exactions have become difficult to require. Legal, financial,
practical, and political obstacles to the use of exactions have led to
an increasing use in development fees, instead.
Development Fees
Development fees are monetary contributions to the costs of
infrastructure that, like exactions, private developers are required to
make to the provision of infrastructure from which they benefit to
ensure new development imparts minimal effect on existing infrastructure
systems and to minimize the financial burden of infrastructure
improvements needed to serve new development on existing facility users.
Like exactions, they are linked to land-use control and development
regulation processes, generally through environmental impact
assessments. They can be collected at any point during the development
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process--rezoning requests, subdivision approval, request for special or
conditional use permits, or initial use of infrastructure facilities.
In contrast to exactions, development fees can be used more easily to
finance facilities required for general development processes. Not only
are they useful in tapping private funds for facilities that confer
premium or special benefits to meet the particular needs of development
in peculiar locations or of peculiar character or both, but they are
useful in tapping private funds for facilities that confer general
benefits. Furthermore, unlike negotiated exactions, development fees
are institutionalized and subject to limited negotiation. As a rule,
they cannot be used to correct existing deficiencies in infrastructure
systems; general revenues must be used to upgrade deficiencies.
There are many types of development fees including impact fees,
infrastructure fees, system development charges, capital facility fees,
building occupancy taxes, and connection fees. They vary considerably
in terms of, for instance, the stage in the development process at which
they are collected, the types of facilities they are used to finance,
the methods by which they are designed, calculated, collected, and
coordinated with land-use and capital-budgeting processes, and their
underlying legislation. Development fees can, for instance, be enacted
as taxes or regulations. Whether they are enacted as one or the other
determines their underlying power and, therefore, the legal limitations
and restrictions on their use.22 In most states, development fees are
22 When development fees are adopted as taxes, they are used to allocate
costs uniformly, not on the basis of benefits received; therefore, development
fees do not constitute a form of private financing when enacted as taxes.
Appendix 3 contains a brief discussion of development fees as taxes.
- 65 -
adopted as regulations, in which case, like exactions, they constitute a
legitimate use of the established regulatory powers granted in state-
enabling legislation authorizing local government to control land use
and development. A few state legislatures have determined that the
general regulatory powers implicit in local government land-use controls
and development regulations are not adequate to legitimize the use of
development fees. In these states, explicit enabling legislation has
been adopted.
To be legitimate as regulations, development fees must comply
with rational nexus. Accordingly, fees adopted as regulations (1) must
be used to the exclusive benefit of those who pay them (the use of fee
revenue must be limited to financing infrastructure that benefits those
who pay the fees); (2) must be set so that each beneficiary pays only
for that share of infrastructure from which s/he benefits; and (3) must
be separated from general government revenues and earmarked for
dispersal. Thus, exclusive beneficiaries of infrastructure may be
required to pay fees sufficient to finance entire facility costs, and if
a facility serves more than one beneficiary, the local government can
require each beneficiary to pay fees that reflect the proportion of
benefits received from use of the facility. Consequently, recent use of
development fees, like exactions, has limited cross-subsidy effects;
users of infrastructure pay for the benefits they receive. Other
guidelines for the application of development fees include the
requirement that they be based on reasonable planning and spending
programs and be coordinated with comprehensive plans and capital
facility plans.
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The chief difficulty with development fees is their dependence on
the development process and their consequent revenue uncertainty. This
facilitates fee enforcement; when fees are not paid, the rights to
develop, build, or occupy a structure can be denied. The problem,
however, is that to the extent that development does not occur, fees are
not collected. This can be particularly problematic when facilities are
built prior to the time at which they are needed and on the expectation
that fees, collected as the development occurs, can be used to service
the debt or, otherwise, pay facility costs.
The establishment of fees systems for large transportation
projects is very complicated because of the difficulty in measuring
usage and because, frequently, much of the need for such facilities,
such as highway and arterial roads, is generated in areas beyond the
boundaries of the fee-administering jurisdiction. Generally, the
process of instituting fee systems for roads involves the following: (1)
the determination of the geographic area over which the fees are to be
imposed; (2) the determination of the anticipated traffic impact of
various land uses within the area, and the costs of any consequently
anticipated road improvements; and (3) the distribution of the costs
among different land uses on the basis of their respective contributions
to the need for improvements (Snyder and Stegman, 1983, p. 81).
In Broward County, Florida, a traffic impact model is used to
determine highway fees for large development projects. The process
begins with an adequacy review of the regional transport network and
local and major road access. A transportation allocation plan (TRIPS)
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is used to allocate auto journeys originating and ending in development
projects to destinations and origins (respectively) in the county road
network. The requisite service levels for each link in the network and
the costs of any necessary upgrading (to the desired Institute of
Transportation Engineers [ITE] standard) are calculated. If a proposed
project does not reduce road service levels (perhaps because of
preexisting excess capacity) below the established minimum ITE standard,
its developer is not required to pay fees. If a project is expected to
reduce road service level below standard, its developer must pay fees
sufficient to elevate service to the desired standard. Fees are
determined separately for each new development project and are based on
actual road conditions at the time the project is proposed.
Essentially, this procedure allocates road costs on the basis of case-
by-case determination of road requirements occasioned by the location
and/or character of proposed development projects.
The fee revenues are earmarked for specific facility improvements
in specific areas, preceded by planning, reasonably related to services
received by their payer, and are intended to constitute a fair share of
service costs. They are adjusted annually according to the price
deflator for the gross national product for the previous twelve months.
Road impact fees for residential development have ranged from $40 to
$832 per residential unit, $5000 to 25,000 per acre of commercial
property, and from $400 to $2,000 per acre for industrial development.
Rather than pay the fees, some developers construct the required
facilities themselves, the expense of which is credited against their
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fee liability. The Broward County system has been criticized for its
unfair treatment of developers; those that use excess road capacity pay
no fees, and the marginal developers whose projects cause road needs to
exceed existing capacity pay fees to cover not only the costs of
capacity required to serve their projects, but implicitly, the costs of
earlier developers' use of excess facility capacity. 23
In Palm Beach, Florida, a very different approach is taken in the
administration of road fees. Unlike the Broward County system, which is
based on case-by-case analysis of roads requirements of each proposed
development project, the Palm Beach system is based entirely on county
averages of road needs, trip lengths, and construction costs. No
account is taken of differences occasioned by the location or character
of development. Road fees for new residential development, for
instance, are based on the number of housing units in the development.
The fee per housing unit is based on (1) the average number of trips per
day originating and ending at a housing unit in the county; (2) one-half
the average length of auto trips in the county; 2 4 (3) the lane-miles of
roads needed to handle the half-trip, based on the average daily
2 3The chief problem with the Broward County road fee system is that it
allows new development to use excess road capacity without paying for it.
This constitutes an unpaid opportunity cost. Furthermore, making the marginal
development project--the project whose road needs depress service levels below
the desired minimum--be solely financially responsible for making the
improvements necessary to bring roads back up to standard is unfair. Because
earlier development also contributes to the reduction in service levels,
strict application of the benefit principle calls for such a development to
bear some of the financial responsibility, as well, for elevating them.
2 4The other half is allocated to the developer of the destination
project.
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capacity of a two-lane road at ITE service level C (the county's minimum
service level standard); and (4) the average cost of building a lane-
mile of road. The product of these variables is adjusted for
intergovernmental highway aid, and the resulting fee is applied
uniformly to all new residential housing units in the county,
irrespective of the county-wide cost differences in meeting highway
needs. The Palm Beach system has been criticized for excessive
uniformity and poor land use and planning.
In the Broward County and Palm Beach cases, development fees are
administered on a county-wide basis. The chief justification for this
is the large amount of intercity travel and the consequent need to
finance roadways with funds from outside city limits.
In some cities, development fees are administered through a
system of small zones into which the city is divided. This allows
infrastructure cost differences to be identified and allocated more in
line with the incidence of benefits. The key characteristic of a
zonally based development fee system is the division of the geographic
area over which the fees are to be imposed (typically a city) into
service zones. This enables fees to vary with infrastructure costs in
different parts of the city, and it also makes it easier to satisfy the
legal requirement that fees be used to the exclusive benefit of those
who pay them. There is no consensus on precisely how large the zones
should be, but it is generally acknowledged that they should be
correlated with the size of the geographic area over which the benefits
from the infrastructure being financed are conferred. Therefore, large
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zones should be used for highways and arterial roads; small zones
should be used for collector roads.
When cities use zonally based fee systems, city planning
officials, typically, make projections of future development and
estimate the number of vehicle trips likely to be generated.
Transportation models are used to assign the trips to parts of the road
system and to identify the improvements necessary to bring those parts
of the system that are depressed by the needs of new development up to
the desired service level standard. Finally, the costs of the necessary
improvements are allocated among anticipated development within the
zone. The entire process is conducted for each zone so that the
resulting fee system reflects the different roadway needs and costs in
different parts of the city. Because this system of development fees
allocates road costs among all new development (rather than just the
marginal development), it does not suffer from the opportunity cost
problem that characterizes the Broward County system. Because it is
based on land-use planning data and projections of actual road needs and
costs (rather than county averages), it does not suffer from the problem
of indiscriminate and extreme uniformity that characterizes the Palm
Beach system.
In the city of Fresno, California a zonal fee system is used to
finance all on-site and off-site infrastructure improvements inside the
city's growth management boundary--a boundary extending from zero to
four miles outside of the city core inside of which has been designated
the preferred location for future development. New development pays for
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infrastructure inside the boundary (either directly or indirectly)
through an elaborate zonally based differential fee system. For each
proposed development project, the city's planning officials conduct a
service delivery review to determine the adequacy of infrastructure
systems and to determine what facility improvements will be needed. Fee
revenues are used to finance, among other facilities, roads, bridges,
overpasses, railroad crossings, traffic signals.
Fresno is divided into urban growth-management zones for each
type of fee-financed facility. The number of zones and their boundaries
vary with the facility. Fees for each type of facilities vary with the
zone and with the land use within each zone. Only new development pays
fees; existing development pays no fees even if it benefits from fee-
financed improvements. Thus, new development is financially responsible
for the costs of all infrastructure improvements required to serve it,
even if the facilities also benefit established development. In each
zone, a base fee, based on improvement costs per acre of undeveloped
land, is calculated for each type of facility. The first developers in
a zone pay 2.5 times the base rate. When the total improvement costs
are collected, the fees are reduced to the base rate. The fee revenue
collected from subsequent developers is used to reimburse the early
developers who paid the accelerated rates. Fees are usually collected
at the time of subdivision mapping. They are statutorily fixed--
established by ordinance as part of the city's growth management system-
-and subject to limited negotiation.
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Proponents of the use of developer exactions and development fees
assert that they constitute convenient methods of solving the urgent
fiscal, economic, political, and practical realities of infrastructure
provision processes in the United States (Snyder and Stegman, 1986, pp.
6). Critics, on the other hand, call them unfair. According to Weitz
(1984, p.12), exactions and development fees are unfair because they
result in a double payment problem for the users of new and/or improved
infrastructure; such users pay the same taxes as users of established
facilities and, therefore, are entitled to the same facilities without
having to pay extra fees. They have also been called unfair because of
their effects on real estate prices. In the Simi Valley, California,
Wood Ranch residential complex, for example, developer exactions were
estimated to have contributed $6000 to the average price of a housing
unit. Exactions and development fees have also been criticized as
constituting government shirking of its social and economic
responsibilities; what begins as an incremental response to fiscal
problems, it has been argued, that can too easily evolve into an entire
financial system (Snyder and Stegman, 1986, pp.6).
Other serious criticisms of the recent use of exactions and
development fees are directed, specifically, at the legal principle of
rational nexus. Criticisms of rational nexus include (1) because there
is no sharing of costs under rational nexus, it constitutes an extreme
interpretation of the benefit principle of distributional equity, (2)
the earmarking it necessitates reduces local government flexibility in
its ability to respond to infrastructure needs, (3) it implicitly places
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the benefit principle of equity above other distributional principles,
such as the ability-to-pay and other considerations, such as an
equitable distribution of resources (income) across populations.
These and other problems with exactions and development fees have
imposed limitations on their use. They are not very commonly used; they
are used more frequently at the local level and less frequently at the
state level. Moreover, their use is not standardized. Many factors
influence their application, such as, project size, public image,
location, and type, the communities and private developers (commercial
or manufacturing) involved. The examples provided in the preceding
discussion were meant to be illustrative, not wholly representative, of
their use. In the following section, we present another form of private
finance for infrastructure--special-assessment financing.
Special-Assessment Financing
Special-assessment financing is based on the principle that there
should be no sharing of the costs of infrastructure that confers special
benefits--benefits that are local or premium. Technically, the legal
definition of special benefits are benefits that increase property
values. The practical difficulty of making this definition operational
(almost all infrastructure improvements increase property values) has
led the courts to develop two other more applicable criteria for
determination of when infrastructure confers special benefits and is,
therefore, eligible for special-assessment financing. Accordingly,
special benefits are benefits that are (1) localized and accrue to only
a few properties, and that (2) accrue to some properties at higher
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levels than to the general public. Thus, localized benefits and premium
service levels serve as the chief criterion for determination of
legitimate use of special-assessment financing. Those who incur such
benefits, and not the general public, should be required to pay the
associated costs. The basic idea is that ". . .the general public should
not be required to pay for the special benefits for the few, and the few
specially benefited should not be subsidized by the general public"
(Kirlin, 1983, p. 18).
The institutional arrangement through which special-assessment
financing is accomplished is the special-assessment district, which is,
traditionally, a dependent, limited-purpose governmental entity that
must rely on other governmental bodies for its financial management and
is used to service the debt administration. Its physical boundaries are
established to coincide with the geographic area over which the special
benefits emanating from a particular infrastructure facility or service
are conferred. Owners of properties located therein are assessed up to
the full costs of the infrastructure, each in proportion to the level of
benefits received.
Typically, the investment costs of the infrastructure are financed out
of the proceeds of a public bond issue by the governmental body
responsible for district financial management and administration.
Assessments may be collected from district property owners on a onetime
or periodic basis. They must be earmarked, they serve as security for
the bonds, and they are used to service the district's debt. Special-
assessment districts have been used to finance the construction,
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maintenance, and operation of all sorts of transportation facilities
including highways, streets, bridges, tunnels, air transport facilities,
water facilities (harbors, ferries, canals, terminals), and transit
facilities, services, vehicles and other equipment.
In downtown Denver, Colorado, specially built vehicles provide
shuttle services along a 14-block "transit mall" lined with retail,
office, and residential development. Investment and maintenance of the
mall is financed through a "Transit Mall Maintenance District."
District property owners are assessed the mall's investment and
maintenance costs. The assessment formula is based on the assumption
that the mall has increased (benefited) district property values by an
average of seven percent and that the benefits decrease proportionately
with distance from the mall. To allocate the costs of the benefits, the
district has been divided into four zones, each of which has been
allocated a portion of the property value increase. The first zone,
which includes properties located within 100 feet of the mall, has been
allocated fifty percent of the total benefit; properties located within
the second 100 feet have been allocated twenty-five percent of the total
benefit; the third 100-foot zone has been allocated fifteen percent of
the total benefit; and the fourth 100-foot zone has been apportioned ten
percent of the total benefit. The assessment formula is intended to
allocate among district property owners the costs of the special
benefits they reap as a result of the transit mall (USDOT, 1982, pp. A-1
through A-2).
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The legal definition of special benefits imposes severe
limitations on the use of special assessments to finance infrastructure.
Legally, only facilities that confer localized (or premium) benefits can
be financed; facilities that confer general benefits or benefits over
entire communities, cities or regions cannot, in general, be financed
through the traditional special-assessment arrangements. Thus,
traditional special-assessment financing is of limited use for financing
the needs of general or large-scale, off-site facilities. In recent
years, there has been some increased latitude in the law governing the
use of special-assessment financing so that, relative to its' historical
use, it can be used to finance a broader range of infrastructure
services and facilities.
For instance, traditionally, infrastructure's special benefits
have been measured and allocated among district properties on the basis
of the front-footage of property abutting the facility, the proportion
of property acreage adjacent to the facility, or the proportion of
square footage of building space located in the vicinity of the
facility. Thus, only properties that abut, are adjacent to, or are in
the vicinity of the facility have, historically, been designated
beneficiaries and assessed facility costs.
In recent years, however, the traditional benefit measurement-
cost allocation procedures have given way to new procedures that reflect
an increasing legal tolerance for their discretionary use as long as the
resulting assessments are "reasonably related" to the special benefits
conferred upon the assessed properties. Moreover, there has been
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greater legal tolerance for the assessment of property that does not
abut, or is not adjacent to, or in the vicinity of the facility for
which a district has been established to finance; more and more,
property that receives only indirect benefits from infrastructure may be
assessed a portion of its costs. Despite changes such as these,
special-assessment financing remains of limited use in allocating
private funds to infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, they remain of
limited use in tapping private funds for infrastructure.
Attempts to broaden the utility of assessment financing to
include facilities that confer general benefits has led to the creation
of two other institutional arrangements--combined use of the traditional
special-assessment district and developer exactions and independent
special districts--which circumvent the legal restrictions on
traditional special-assessments financing and which are used to
allocate the costs of general facilities proportionately among their
beneficiaries.
Traditional Special-Assessment Districts
and Developer Exactions
The combined use of the traditional special-assessment district
and developer exactions has enabled a broader use of assessment
financing than has occurred historically. As exactions have involved
over the years from facilities and services that "directly and
exclusively" benefit their contributor (on-site and other highly
localized facilities), to include facilities that only indirectly
benefit their contributor and/or confer benefits to a general population
- 78 -
(large-scale, off-site facilities), developers have sought ways to
reduce exactions' costs. One of the ways in which they have been able
to do this is through the establishment of special-assessment districts.
Facilities financed through special-assessment districts are eligible
for tax-exempt financing, and developers have increasingly initiated
district establishment in order to gain access to cheaper funds to
finance the exactions required of them. Once formed, the district (or
the governmental body responsible for its financial administration)
issues tax-exempt debt and lends the proceeds to the developer (at
interest rates lower than those offered in private money markets) who
invests the funds in exactions. District debt is retired through
assessments collected from district property owners. The expense of
district establishment has meant that their use as a means of defraying
exactions' costs tends to be limited to large development projects that
create the need for large-scale, off-site, general facilities.
The special-assessment districts that have been used to lower the
cost of exactions range from the traditional, financially and
administratively dependent, limited-scope district to nearly the
independent district that retain management control, maintenance, and
capital financing responsibilities for several types of infrastructure
after construction and dedication. There are special-improvement
districts, general-improvement districts, limited-improvement districts,
maintenance districts, recreational-facility districts, community-
facility districts, building-authority districts, and redevelopment
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districts, and parking districts. Their names reflect variables such as
financing functions, legislative frameworks, and regional location.
With this broadened application of special-assessment finance,
five new benefit-assessment and cost-allocation procedures have evolved:
acreage fees, land-value charges, property taxes, development fees and
connection charges. Under acreage-fee procedures, property owners are
assessed costs on the basis of the amount of acreage they own in the
district. Land-value charges are assessments made on the basis of
annual changes in district property land values. Under the property-tax
procedures, assessments are made on the basis of annual changes in the
value of real property. Development fees and connection charges are
used to allocate costs among district properties as development occurs
and benefits from (connects to) preexisting infrastructure with built-in
excess capacity. The procedures reflect the growing need to assess
infrastructure costs from district properties that benefit from, but
that do not abut, or are not adjacent to or in the vicinity of the
district-financed facilities. The traditional methods--front-footage,
square acreage, and square footage procedures--are, more accurately,
measures of the costs of facility provision and have increasingly given
way to the new procedures, which better reflect the distribution of
benefits from infrastructure.
One example of the combined use of exactions and special-
assessment districts is the Briargate development located near Colorado
Springs, Colorado. The developers of Briargate--a 9,100-acre, mixed-use
development--negotiated an annexation agreement that required them to
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dedicate a multimillion dollar highway interchange, arterial road
improvements, all roads and utilities within the development, as well as
250 acres for school sites and up to 10 more acres for two fire stations
and one police station. The facilities valued at between $60 and 65
million were financed through a special-assessment district called a
"building authority". Colorado building authorities are authorized by
state statute upon city approval. They have no taxing power, but can
levy development fees and other user charges to pay for infrastructure.
The proceeds from tax-exempt revenue bonds guaranteed by the assessments
were used to finance the exactions. Once completed, the facilities were
placed under public ownership and control. (Snyder and Stegman, 1986,
p. 65.)
Because from a strictly legal perspective, special-assessment
financing is limited to facilities that confer special benefits, and
because there is some question regarding the legality of exactions of
facilities that confer general benefits, the combined use of special-
assessment districts and exactions is legally questionable. In many
instances, it is not clear if the arrangement would be upheld in court.
Nevertheless, it tends to go unchallenged because it enables developers
(the likely litigants) to lower the costs of exactions required to
support their development activities. In general, as long as the costs
of providing the exactions through special- assessment districts is less
than the costs of project cancellations, delays or litigation, the use
of special-assessment districts to finance exactions of general
infrastructure facilities will likely remain unchallenged. Independent
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special districts, described in the following section, are another
institutional arrangement by which the legal limitations on the use of
the traditional special-assessment district have been circumvented in
recent years.
Independent Special Districts
Independent special districts constitute another institutional
arrangement by which legal limitations restricting traditional special-
assessment financing to infrastructure that confers special benefits are
circumvented, thus enabling the use of assessment revenues to finance
facilities that confer general benefits. Their chief distinguishing
feature is their autonomy. Financially autonomous, they are, typically,
authorized to manage their own capital and operating budgets, levy
taxes, calculate and collect assessments, and issue and service debt,
and they are not subject to statutory limits on local government debt.
They are also generally administratively autonomous. Established on the
basis of state, regional, or local government approval, they are self-
governing by an appointed or popularly elected body that represents
infrastructure users in up to several general-purpose--i.e., city and
county- -government jurisdictions. Furthermore, independent special
districts often retain management and operational control over the
facilities for which they are established to finance. Finally,
independent special districts are politically and institutionally
autonomous; they are distinct and separate from general-purpose
government.
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A second distinguishing characteristic of independent special
districts is that because they are not subordinate to other levels of
government, they are not legally restricted to financing infrastructure
that confers special benefits. So they are frequently used to finance
facilities that confer general benefits, e.g., airports, highways, mass
transit, and water transport facilities.
A third distinguishing characteristic is that the costs of
facilities that they are established to finance are generally allocated
among district properties uniformly, irrespective of the incidence of
benefits. Taxes, fees, user charges, and other methods that distribute
costs uniformly are the sources of independent special district
revenues. Thus, in general, independent special districts have not been
used to finance infrastructure privately. Traditionally, they are just
another institutional arrangement by which infrastructure is publicly
financed.
In recent years, however, some independent special districts have
assumed features that typically characterize the traditional special-
assessment district. District boundaries are established so as to
isolate geographically the beneficiaries of infrastructure and to assess
them facility costs in accordance to the benefits they receive. Because
independent special districts are not restricted from financing
infrastructure that confers general benefits, their modified use has
enabled such facilities to be financed with private funds.
According to Porter, Lin, and Peiser (1987, p. 25), in New
Jersey, counties may establish Transportation Development Districts
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(TDDs) to finance transportation needs of high-growth areas. They allow
county assessment of fees on private development to help pay for
highways and mass transit improvements made necessary by new
development. Counties seeking the establishment of TDDs must submit an
application to the state commissioner of transportation. The
application must include proposed boundaries, evidence of growth
conditions, description of transportation needs and available resources,
certification of up-to-date master plan, and proof that the proposed
district will conform to that and state transportation plans.
Subsequently, a planning session, which includes state, county,
municipal government agencies, and interested private parties, is
conducted to prepare a draft TDD proposal. The proposal is to include,
among other things, goals for transport facilities in the county(ies)
and a program of the projects to be financed through the district.
Following a public hearing, the affected county(ies) adopt, by ordinance
or resolution, the district transportation improvement plan which is,
then, submitted to the state commissioner for final approval. A
development fee ordinance may also be enacted to assess impact fees,
establish the TDD trust fund (from which all district expenditures must
be expropriated), and establish a date before which developments are
exempt from fees. The annual development fee can take the form of
vehicle trip fee, square footage of development fee, employee fee, or a
parking space fee. Essentially, the TDD is a tax-assessing district
through which revenue bonds are issued to finance transportation
projects. Fee revenues are used to retire the revenue bonds used to
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finance the improvements. TDDs are dependent on the counties that
create them. Each TDD funded project is subject to agreement among all
affected state, county, and other parties.
Special-assessment financing has important advantages over
traditional public finance, including price and consumption
efficiencies, and the insulation of infrastructure finance decisions
from the capital-budgeting process. It also, however, has been subject
to criticisms that have precluded its more expansive use to finance
infrastructure, including lack of political accountability to
constituency populations, lack of effective coordination among districts
and between districts and other governmental bodies, and the problems of
assessment, formal determination of responsibility, and allocation of
responsibility of district administration.
Analysis
In this final section of the chapter, we analyze exactions,
development fees, and special-assessment financing, in terms of the
extent to which they constitute private finance, and we identify some of
their salient distributional effects, and characteristics of their
economic contexts, legislative framework, and administrative features.
For the purpose of this study, we have specified the definition
of private finance to be finance by which costs are allocated on the
basis of the benefit principle, and in which there is no sharing or
cross-subsidization of costs. In this context, exactions, development
fees, and special-assessment, constitute forms of private finance. The
finance principle establishing legitimate use of exactions and
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development fees is "reasonableness under due process," or rational
nexus--there must be a rational nexus between the exaction or fee and
infrastructure needs created by the contributor. The finance principle
establishing legitimate use of special-assessment districts is special
benefits--localized or premium benefits. Theoretically, adherence to
either of these two financing principles results in infrastructure costs
being allocated exclusively among beneficiaries and in accordance to the
quality and quantity of benefits received. The chief difference between
the principles is in the scope of the type of facilities for which they
enable private financing; reasonableness under due process, or, more
specifically, rational nexus, enables private funds to be used for any,
including general, infrastructure services and facilities, and the
special benefit principle limits private financing to local facilities.
The degree to which either finance principle is adhered to
determines the extent to which the applications constitute private
finance. Based on our observations, few, if any, infrastructure
projects are privately financed in the strict sense. In each of the
cases we observed, there are public finance or cross-subsidy effects.
For instance, in those cases in which private developers have financed
the entire costs of facilities that serve general populations (the
Fresno fee system and the Fairfax County case in which private
developers financed the full cost of a state and interstate highway
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interchanges), there is a public finance component.2 5 Moreover, the
public finance component varies among cases. The financing arrangements
of the Fresno development fee system, in which fees vary across small
zones to reflect infrastructure cost differences occasioned by the
location and character of different development projects and result in
fees that closely reflect the distribution of infrastructure benefits,
is more private than the Broward County fee system. The Broward County
system, in which marginal developers pay the full costs of upgrading
highways that earlier development benefits from (they, too, contribute
to the depression of highway service below the desired service level
standard, but pay nothing for the benefits they receive) is more private
than the Palm Beach system through which costs are allocated on the
basis of county-wide averages and which, therefore, allocate costs
relatively uniformly.
To the extent that exactions, development fees, and special-
assessments, do allow infrastructure to be privately financed, costs to
be allocated strictly on the basis of the distribution of benefits, and
cross-subsidy effects to be minimal, they have limited redistributional
effects; those who have the requisite funds may benefit from the
quantity and quality of infrastructure of their choice, and those who do
not, cannot. Therefore, to the extent that the techniques do establish
private finance, they reinforce and perhaps exacerbate existing economic
25The public component is derived from the fact that because the
developers are not the only beneficiaries of the improvements, and,
nevertheless, pay the entire costs of the improvement, they are, thereby,
subsidizing the costs of highway benefits received by the general population
of motorists who will benefit from the improvements.
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inequalities; this they do to the extent that they result in the
allocation of private financial resources to and, thereby, strengthening
of infrastructure support systems used in those areas and by those
populations characterized by relative economic strength. This
observation, that private financing of infrastructure results in more
and/or better services and facilities for higher-income users
(individuals, regions, households, firms, etc.) is supported by the
examples provided in the earlier parts of the chapter. Private
financial and other resources were allocated to projects in areas such
as Manhattan Island in New York City, New York; Fairfax County,
Virginia; and Fresno, California, all of which are areas that can be
characterized as relatively high-income and economically strong. They
are all areas in which the infrastructure user populations are
relatively more capable of supporting the financing principle upon which
private finance is based (the benefit principle), and, in which,
consequently, the return to private resources is likely to be greatest.
An analysis of the economic context within which exactions,
development fees, and special-assessment financing have been applied
reveals that the single most salient characteristic is the deterioration
of government fiscal capacity. The deterioration has been enough to
cause significant declines in public expenditures on infrastructure
(Aschauer, 1989, 1990; NCPWI, 1988, pp. 1-10; International
Transportation Engineering [ITE], 1986, pp. 3-6; Peterson, 1984, pp.
112-116). As a result of the declines, many parts of the U.S.
infrastructure system are functioning at minimal or substandard levels;
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and there are some examples of total systems breakdown (Vaughan, 1984,
pp. 1; Choate and Walter, 1981). Consequently, some infrastructure
systems pose impending threats to public health, safety, and welfare,
and in some instances, public health, safety, and welfare have already
been compromised (Grossman, 1979, pp. 83-85). As a result, more private
resources have had to be allocated to the nation's infrastructure needs
(Vogt and Cole, 1983, pp. 1-2; Vaughan, 1984, pp. 57-77; ITE, 1986, pp.
8-11; Hatry, 1989, p.4). We conclude, then, that the seriousness of
government fiscal constraints--infrastructure expenditures have been
reduced to the point at which public health, safety, and welfare have
been and stand to be compromised--constitutes the single most important
characteristic of the economic context in which privatization has been
implemented in the United States.
The legislative framework for the use of exactions, development
fees, and special-assessment financing is best characterized as a
intricate and complex web of laws, regulations, principles, and formal
and informal guidelines at federal, state, and local levels of
government. Any infrastructure project financed with private funds is a
product of a myriad of federal and particularly state and local
government legal factors. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to
characterize "the legislative context" for privatization in the United
States. Aside from its breadth, diversity, and complexity, the only
other characteristic that we can clearly discern is its increasing
liberalization.
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Over the years, established laws, legal principles, regulations,
guidelines, etc. regarding the use of private funds for infrastructure
have been altered and reinterpreted in ways such that, in contrast to
fifty years ago, private funds have been or are proposed to be used to
finance virtually every type of infrastructure facility and service.
Snyder and Stegman, (1986, pp. 22-23; 53-61) provide an account of the
historical evolution of the use of private funds for infrastructure
projects.
Early case and statutory law limited the role of private funds in
infrastructure financing to special-assessment financing of facilities
that conferred special benefits. In later years, exactions and
development fees were allowed, but only for facilities that were
reasonably related or "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
infrastructure needs of their contributor. In both instances, private
funds were limited to local facilities. Today, as a result of a
considerably expanded legislative context that allows the combined use
of special-assessment district and exactions, and the modified use of
independent special districts as well as exactions and development fees
that must merely constitute a "rational nexus" to the infrastructure
needs created by their contributor, private funds have been allocated to
a much broader range of facilities and services than historically
possible.
Other manifestations of legislative liberalization of the use of
private funds for infrastructure include court acceptance of the new
benefit-measurement and cost-allocation procedures for special-
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assessment financing--procedures that, in effect, allocate
infrastructure costs among many indirect as well as direct
beneficiaries; and recognition, by most state legislatures, that the
powers implicit in existing land-use and development regulations are
sufficient legal basis for local government requirements of exactions
and development fees.
Finally, one of the most salient characteristics of the
administrative features of exactions, development fees, and special-
assessment financing, is the role played by the public sector. The
public sector is frequently responsible for identifying prospective
privatization projects--identifying infrastructure needs on the basis of
environmental impact analysis conducted for proposed development
projects and developing strategies of public-private cooperation by
which to meet those needs. Furthermore, the public sector guides
private participation in the projects, through regulations, standards,
and guidelines designed to 'ensure that project outcomes are consistent
with social and economic welfare objectives and to ensure that
development proceeds in a logical and coordinated manner.
CHAPTER 4
PRIVATE FINANCING OF TRANSPORTATION
INFRASTRUCTURE IN SWEDEN
In this chapter, we accomplish three objectives. First, we
provide a brief description of the general institutional framework for
planning and development in Sweden in order to understand the general
institutional context within which private financing of infrastructure
has occurred in that country.26 Second, through a description of the
Vasaterminalen project, we provide a conceptual and empirical
description of one of the ways in which transportation and other forms
of infrastructure is privately financed in Sweden. Third, we conduct a
brief analysis of the project to assess the extent to which it
constitutes private finance and to identify some of the salient
characteristics of its distributional effects, and economic, legislative
framework, and administrative contexts. Combined with analogous
information for the United States contained in Chapter 3, the
information provided in this chapter forms the basis of a comparative
analysis of U.S. and Swedish privatization and our conclusions, in
Chapter 5, regarding some of the factors that influence infrastructure
finance policy.
26The information presented in this section of the chapter is based on a
paper written by Cars and Jirlow (1987). Concepts presented in their
document, which are sometimes difficult to translate directly from one
language to another, are subject to our interpretation. For instance, the
"public display" of planning documents referenced in their document is called
a "public hearing" in this chapter.
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In Sweden, each of the three levels of government (national,
regional, and local) is actively involved in planning and development
processes. At the national or state level, the Ministry of Housing and
Physical Planning is principally responsible for the establishment of
the general legislative guidelines followed by the lower levels of
government and for the allocation of resources (construction permits and
funds) required for physical planning, housing provision, and
construction. State decisions and activities with regard to planning
and development processes are intended to ensure that social and
economic welfare goals are fulfilled and that planning and development
take place in an effective and rational manner. They are also intended
to ensure that other actors in planning and development processes, such
as private developers, fulfill their tasks in a manner that is
consistent with established legislation and standards.
The County Administration Boards provide practical guidance and
support to planning and building activities at the regional level. They
coordinate State and regional planning activities as well as planning
activities within their jurisdictions. They also ratify development
plans and act in a supervisory capacity to hear appeals.
At the local level, the municipalities exercise the strongest
influence on planning and development processes. They play an important
role in virtually every aspect of the planning and development process--
planning, monitoring, and financing. On the basis of studies and
analysis of economic and social needs, they conduct much of the physical
planning. They monitor building-permit applications and ensure that new
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buildings meet established construction standards. They also play an
important role in the administration of state loans and subsidies for
development.
Shaping the Swedish Planning and Development Process
Several laws and other factors play a crucial role in the shaping
the context for Swedish planning and development. The Building Act and
the Building Ordinance, for instance, are used by public administrators
to regulate physical planning and building activity. Accordingly, all
land used for construction must be subject to planning. This allows the
public authorities who regulate land use to decide where, when and, what
type of development takes place.
Types of Plans
Land use is regulated by comprehensive and detailed plans. The
comprehensive plans are Regional Plans and Master Plans, and the
detailed plans are Town and Building Plans.
Regional plans are use to guide development in two or more
municipalities that have needs for shared facilities, such as highway
systems and airports. Regional Plans may be used as general guidelines
for the municipalities involved or they may be ratified by the State, in
which case they become compulsory. Master plans are used to guide
development within a single municipality. They serve as general
guidelines for the more detailed Town and Building plans and are among
the most important means by which the public sector regulates land use.
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Three other types of plans are used by public land use
administrators at the municipal level. First, there are comprehensive
Land Use Plans, which contain alternative projections of future
municipal development. Second, Structure Plans are used to illustrate
the various regulations, guidelines, and restrictions on municipal
development. Third, District Plans provide rough guidelines for
development in particular areas within municipalities.
Detailed plans are required for all urban development. They
consist of schematic maps with regulations and comments that dictate the
types and locations of development permitted in particular areas within
a municipality. Once adopted by a municipal council, they are subject
to State and County ratification. There are two types of detailed
plans--town plans and building plans. Both provide detailed regulatory
guidelines for development, such as buildings boundaries, blocks,
streets, and public places. Town plans are used in urban areas, and
building plans are generally used in other areas.
In recent years a new Planning and Building Act has been adopted
by the Swedish Parliament. It is essentially the same as the previous
Act with the exceptions that it decentralizes planning powers,
simplifies and modernizes the planning system, abolishes lengthy
building bans and empowers municipalities with the ability to vary
building permits, and includes laws and other measures intended to
increase the public's participation in the planning process.
In addition to physical planning legislation, the following are
other laws and measures designed to regulate planning and development in
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Sweden. The Expropriation Act enables municipal acquisition of land
needed for development. The Preemption Act allows municipalities to
preempt buyers in real estate transactions. The Building Code contains
regulations pertinent to building design and construction. The
Environmental Protection Act contains regulations governing the
protection of air and water resources, noise, etc. The Nature
Conservation Act contains regulations used to preserve areas of
scientific value and recreational and related needs. Municipal Long-
Term Financial Plans and Housing Programs (plans for new construction
and reconstruction) also shape planning and development processes.
Another set of legislation relevant to planning and development
processes governs land ownership. To enable municipal acquisition of
land required for municipal development, in addition to the Preemption
and Expropriation Acts, there are voluntary bargains (most common) and
land exchanges. Municipalities can also acquire land under certain
provisions of the Building and Nature Conservation Acts, as well. Land
ownership is also influenced by the "land condition" rule--a rule that
establishes eligibility for State-financed housing-development loans.
According to it, builders generally are not eligible for State loan
subsidies unless the land they are developing has been acquired from a
municipality. There are exceptions--owner-occupied single family
housing units and estate redevelopment. When municipal land is not
needed for municipal use, its ownership can be retained through a lease-
hold system; the land may be leased to private developers for use as
dictated in municipal plans. Particularly in recent years, because of
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strained economic conditions, most municipalities sell land for which
they have no need. The municipality of Stockholm operates a very large
land-lease system. Municipalities have been buying, selling, and
leasing land for several decades. As a result, they own most of the
land required for urban development within their jurisdictions. They
are in a "strong monopoly" position and, consequently, exert a strong
influence on urban development processes. (Anas, et al., 1985, p. 38)
Planning and Development Processes
On the basis of State planning and development guidelines,
municipalities adopt comprehensive plans. The plans are intended to
reflect changes in labor markets, demographics, living standards, and
recreational needs, and they are used to dictate the pattern of
municipal land use. The comprehensive plan is also used to guide the
more localized detailed plans. The contents of these plans, created by
Municipal Executive Committees, include civic survey maps which indicate
the conditions of developing areas, lists of the owners of property in
developing areas, maps indicating the planned use and density of
developing areas, descriptions of developing areas and reasons for their
prospective development, regulations, surveys of technical and economic
conditions of developing areas, and accounts of preparatory
consultations with land owners, public authorities and others in the
planning process.
The process of creating plans may be organized in one of three
possible ways. First, ownership of the land that is to be developed may
be transferred to an investor after the municipality has created the
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detailed plan. The responsibilities of the investor, who may be a
private or public enterprise and who is, increasingly, the initiator of
development projects, include site acquisition, arrangement of project
finance, submission of applications for building permits, hiring of
consultants and contractors, and the overseeing of the construction
process. The second possible way of organizing plan creation involves
the transferring of land ownership to the investor during the plan
development process. This arrangement enables the investor to
participate in the plan development process. The third organizational
form, a "flexible plan," provides only general regulatory guidelines and
may be created in lieu of a detailed plan.
Once the plan is complete, it must undergo a public hearing and,
subsequently, revision by the Building Committee. After a second public
hearing, it is submitted to the Municipal Council for adoption and to
the County Administration for approval and ratification. Plans of
particularly broad interest are subject to State ratification.
Once the plan is ratified, the construction process begins. The
first step in the process involves the creation of a development
contract, which is used as a complement to the regulations contained in
the detailed plan. There are two general types of development
contracts. In some instances, the investor owns the land to be
developed, and areas needed for parks, roads, etc. are transferred to
the municipality. In other instances, the land is owned by the
municipality. In these cases, the municipality invites tenders for
construction and grants the construction contract to the tender that
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makes the preferred offer. The ownership of the municipal land is
transferred to the investor during the construction phase, after which
infrastructure facilities are handed over to the municipality.
Prior to actual construction, negotiations are conducted between
the investor and the municipality. The negotiations establish the legal
boundaries and plots of the development. During this time, water,
sewer, and other economic and technical studies are conducted, and a
building program is agreed upon. Once the negotiations are complete, a
legal contract for construction is signed. "Building documents," which
contain the detailed information required for the invitation to tenders
and the construction work are, then, drawn up. Finally, the investor
makes an application for a building permit.
To begin the construction phase, several contractors may be hired
through an "invitation to tenders." The responsibility of the
contractors is to provide general construction supervision, to conduct
the actual construction, to provide the necessary labor, and to maintain
the contacts with municipal authorities. The invitation to tenders may
be open to any bidders, limited to specific bidders, or not open at all,
in which case a particular contractor is selected. Once the contractor
is selected, another set of negotiations is conducted--between the
investor and contractor to establish purchasing and price agreements.
Finally, the actual contract is negotiated. The specific contractual
arrangement may take the form of a "distributed contract by tender" in
which specific construction tasks are distributed among numerous
contractors each of whom has direct contractual arrangements with the
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investor. Or, it may take the form of a "general contract by tender."
In this arrangement, direct contractual agreement with the investor is
limited to a single general contractor who, in turn, hires
subcontractors. A "total contract by tender" may also be used. It is
similar to the "general contract by tender" except that, in addition to
the actual construction, the general contractor is also responsible for
the project work. Once construction is complete, investors assume
control of the building either for their own use, or they may sell or
lease the structure.
Thus, there is a strong formal system for planning and
development in Sweden. The public sector, particularly at the municipal
level, exerts a powerful influence on development activity through
various laws, regulations, and guidelines. Laws governing land
ownership, for instance, essentially enable municipalities to have a
monopoly over much developable land, enabling them to exert a
significant amount of influence on planning and development processes.
We mentioned earlier that the municipality of Stockholm operates
a very large land-lease system. The land-lease procedures have recently
been applied in a very unusual manner in the city of Stockholm. The
application involves a public-private cooperative arrangement through
which private financial (and other) resources are used to fund a
relatively large-scale transportation infrastructure investment project-
-the Vasaterminalen project.
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The Vasaterminalen Project
Until recently, the area around Stockholm's Central Station has
been plagued by severe traffic congestion problems.27 The problems
resulted chiefly from the station's lack of adequate bus terminal
facilities. Buses were, therefore, forced to park and to load and
unload passengers on adjacent streets. A technical solution to the
problem was devised by the Stockholm Real Estate Office (SREO) during
the 1960s. The solution called for the construction of a platform or
deck over the station's railyard upon which the bus terminal could be
constructed. The Swedish State Railroad Company (SSRC), the public
authority responsible for capital investments in the national railroad
system did not have the funds required to implement the solution, and so
for many years, the problem got worse.
During the late 1970s, the SREO staff devised a proposal that has
enabled the bus terminal to be constructed. They proposed that the
construction of a deck larger than that needed for the terminal would
provide the SSRC with new leasable property, the income from which could
be used to finance the design and construction of the deck, the bus
terminal, and any ancillary infrastructure improvements. In accordance
with established municipal plans, the deck would be leased for office
space development.
2 7This part of the chapter is based extensively on interviews with
individuals familiar with the Vasaterminalen project. For the names of
individuals interviewed, refer to the Appendix 1. Much of the information
gathered during these interviews is contained in earlier, more detailed
descriptions of the project (Todman, 1987, 1988). We omitted much of that
information here, because it is not directly relevant to the present study.
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The legal and institutional framework for this proposal is the
land-lease system. The law that serves as the legal basis of the
proposal is Tomtratt.28 Tomtratt is a land-lease law that dates back to
the early years of this century. It essentially establishes the
conditions under which public land can be leased for nonpublic purposes.
The lease income is typically used to finance municipal modernization.
According to the law, the lease rights to municipal land can be granted
to private developers, for instance, for sixty-year periods after which
forty-year lease periods can be negotiated. In general, the leases
cannot be terminated prior to the end of the negotiated lease period,
except under those circumstances in which there is a need or desire on
the part of the public owner to alter the use of the land; the land
owner can terminate the lease.
Lease payments are determined on the basis of the location of the
land and the use into which it is placed while being leased. The
payments are, therefore, subject to significant variations.' For
instance, in recent years, payments for public land located in the city
of Stockholm and leased for office development have been relatively high
because of shortages of the office space in and around the city, and
payments for municipally owned land and leased for residential
development have remained relatively low because of a strictly enforced
residential rent-control policy. Once negotiated, lease payments remain
fixed for 10 years unless otherwise specified in the lease contract.
Any appreciation in land value during the lease period may be captured
28This description of the Tomtratt law is based on a translation of the
actual legislation--Tomtratt, Jordabalken Kapitel 13.
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by the land owner through adjustments in the lease payments at the end
of each 10-year period. Such adjustments are made in real estate courts
in accordance with the specifications contained in lease agreements and
on the basis of factors such as inflation, changes in land use, or
regulatory changes.
From our perspective, one of the most interesting aspects of
Tomtratt is its conveyance of quasi-private ownership rights to the
lessee. The lessee "owns" the land lease and is, thereby, entitled to
many of the rights typically associated with land ownership in the
United States. For instance, land-lease owners may sell their ownership
rights, they are subject to limited restrictions on such sales, and they
may use their leases as security for loans. Another striking
characteristic of Tomtratt is that it includes provisions that enable
the public land owners to demand that the lease owner construct and
maintain any necessary infrastructure support facilities. Thus, it is
very similar, in effect, to the use of developer exactions and
development fees in the United States--private developers are obliged to
provide necessary support facilities in exchange for development rights.
This characteristic of Tomtratt makes it part of the legal foundation
underlying the use of private funds for infrastructure services and
facilities in Sweden.
The Vasaterminalen project constitutes an innovative application
of the land-lease law, and its outcome is certain to effect the future
of the use of private financial resources for infrastructure projects in
Sweden. For that reason, we will examine the project in some detail.
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Normally, the land leased under the Tomtratt provisions is
preexisting public property that is of limited public value in its
established use. The lease of such property is frequently of greater
value than in it established public use because of the lease income it
generates. In the Vasaterminalen case, however, the public property
that is being leased was not preexisting; it has been created expressly
for the purpose of Tomtratt application. The purposeful creation of
leasable public property is considered to be a new and innovative
concept in Sweden.
After a detailed analysis of the proposed technical and financial
solution to the Central station area traffic congestion problem, and a
preliminary feasibility study, in the fall of 1982, the SREO and the
SSRC initiated the process of negotiating a development contract. The
secondary development contract (described in the first part of the
chapter) was selected. An "open invitation to tenders" (a form of
competitive bidding) was issued for the design and construction of the
deck, bus terminal, and ancillary infrastructure. The winner was to be
awarded government design and construction contracts and the land-lease
rights to part of the deck. Bidders were instructed to include in their
proposals an estimated price for the construction of the deck, bus
terminal, parking facilities, street and rail yard reconstruction, and
other infrastructure improvements that would be required as a condition
of the grant of the lease rights; an estimated annual lease payment; and
a proposal as to how the infrastructure facilities could be financed
with minimal public financial support.
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The opportunity to win government design and construction
contracts, to be granted the land-lease rights to public property
located adjacent to Stockholm's central business district (the principal
hub of Sweden's communications and transportation systems), and to
construct, own, and operate an office complex on that property generated
considerable interest in the private sector. Seven proposals were
submitted, and after several rounds of evaluations by a jury composed of
staff from various agencies of the city of Stockholm and the SSRC, the
proposal submitted by the investment group Vasaterminalen AB was
selected in December, 1983. Vasaterminalen AB and its project,
Vasaterminalen, are owned jointly by a consortium of private companies
formed expressly to bid on the government contracts--
Fastighetsaktiebolaget Hufvudstaden AB, a private real estate developer,
SIAB AB, a private contractor, and L. E. Lundbergforetagen AB, also a
private contractor. Each owns equal shares in the company, the project,
and in what, when completed, will be a 50,000 square meter office
complex with work space for 2,000 to 2,500 people, a lecture hall,
conference rooms, a restaurant, and other service facilities.
In August 1984, after extensive negotiations between public
authorities and the developers, a final agreement was reached.
Subsequently, a building program was developed, and a legal contract for
construction was signed by the public authorities and the developer.
The set of first construction documents, which contained detailed
information relevant for the contracting out of various aspects of the
construction process, were submitted for approval in March, 1985. After
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the developers applied for and were granted a building permit,
construction began in April, 1985. The project was scheduled to be
completed by December, 1989. Buses started to use the terminal in the
spring of 1989, but a minor amount of the final construction was still
being completed in the spring of 1990.
During the construction phase, the ownership of the project site
was transferred to the developers. When construction is completed, the
ownership of the infrastructure will be transferred to the public
sector. The deck, bus terminal, and upgraded rail yard works will be
transferred to the SSRC; and the ancillary facilities--(re)constructed
streets, bridges, a pedestrian tunnel, a viaduct, and a small electrical
station--will be transferred to the city of Stockholm, which will
operate and maintain the facilities and pay for them through an
elaborate financial arrangement.
The SSRC will lease that part of the deck occupied by the bus
terminal to Stockholms Terminal AB, a public company created expressly
for the purpose of financing, operating, maintaining, and managing the
Central Station bus terminal. The company is jointly owned by the
Stockholm County Transport Company (40%), the SSRC (40%), and the city
of Stockholm (20%). Each owner will share in the use of the terminal.
The lease period will extend for 60 years beginning in 1990, the first
full year of planned project operation. For the first 20 years of the
lease period, Stockholms Terminal AB will make no lease payments to the
SSRC. After that, negotiations will be conducted to establish a new
annual lease fee.
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The SSRC will lease the rest of the deck to Vasaterminalen AB,
which has been granted the right to construct an office complex on the
property. This lease period, too, will extend for 60 years beginning
in 1990. The annual lease payment during this period will be 20 million
Swedish Kroner (Skr)--the product of a statutorily fixed figure
(intended to reflect project location, expected value, and quality) and
the size of the office complex--50,000 square meters. After the first
twenty years, the lease fee will be renegotiated. Throughout the lease
period, the developers will retain ownership and operational and
management control of the office complex.
In May 1984, the official cost of the Vasaterminalen project was
660 million Skr. The cost of designing and constructing the bus
terminal was valued at approximately 240 million Skr, the ancillary
infrastructure was valued at 85 million Skr, the office complex was
projected to cost 290 million Skr, and the developer's fee was 45
million Skr. Thus, total public facility cost was 325 million Skr.
The financial arrangement by which the developers proposed to pay
the infrastructure capital costs provide an example of how private funds
have been used in the financing of infrastructure in Sweden in recent
years. (Reference to Diagrams 1 and 2 will assist in understanding the
description that follows.) The developers agreed to subsidize the
investment costs by almost 50 percent. They agreed to design and
construct the facilities for 165 million Skr (out of their retained
earnings and funds borrowed in Swedish private capital markets).
Moreover, because the SSRC did not even have sufficient resources with
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DIAGRAM 1
KEY PUBLIC-PRIVATE FINANCIAL INTERACTIONS
IN THE VASATERMINALEN PROJECT
STOCKHOLM TERMINAL AB
-SSRC
-STOCKHOLM COUNTY TRANSPORT
-CITY OF STOCKHOLM
lease payments
lease of deck
for bus termi
SSRC
nal
STATE
Subsidies for
municipal street
and bridge
improvements
new/reconstructed
bridges and streets
CITY OF
STOCKHOLM
State subsidy for
municipal street
and bridge works;
Municipal land
se deck
m ents lease
VASATERMINALEN AB
*Loan and debt service related to the investments costs (paid initially
by the developers through a loan agreement and ultimately by the SSRC
through amortization and interest payments) of the public
infrastructure--deck, bus terminal and ancillary facilities.
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DIAGRAM 2
ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VASATERMINALEN
LOAN AND LEASE AGREEMENTS
5/84-----------------(grace period)--------------12/89
355 m Skr investment
costs; Subsidized
public cost - 165 m Skr ---inflation--- 200 m Skr -value of
infrastructure upon construction
completion
3/1/90----------------------3/1/2010------------------2050
first year of project 400 m Skr - lease ends
operation-- full payment of
-exchange of notes amortization and
of obligation (20 m lease payments
Skr annually;
-amortization
period begins
-lease period begins
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which to pay the even the subsidized investment costs, the developers
agreed to lend the 165 million Skr to the SSRC. The deck is being used
as collateral for the loan which will be amortized over a 20-year period
beginning in 1990. The inflation and interest adjusted annual debt
payments will be 20 million Skr and serviced out of the proceeds of the
railroad company's deck lease income. Because the developer's lease
payments offset the railroad company's debt service payments, there will
be no real flow of funds between the SSRC and Vasaterminalen AB during
the first 20 years of project operation. The SSRC will receive no cash
lease income, and Vasaterminalen AB will receive no cash repayments of
the loan.
The payments will be limited to paper transactions, evidenced
only by accounting entries. On March 1st of each year from 1990 through
1999, the SSRC and Vasaterminalen AB will exchange notes of obligation;
the SSRC will give a 20 million Skr debt note to Vasaterminalen AB, and
the developers will give a 20 million Skr lease note to the railroad
company. At the end of the 20-year period, when the loan is amortized,
the annual fee for the lease of the deck will be renegotiated. In the
end, the SSRC will have received capital facilities, at a price greatly
subsidized by private financial resources, that it has needed, but been
unable to afford for a long time. Eight mutually consistent contracts
underlie the Vasaterminalen project. Four of them involve the investors
and the SSRC--a leasehold agreement (which contains the details
regarding the lease of the deck), a leasehold contract (legal
presentation of the leasehold agreement), a building contract
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(specifications of the financial obligations of the developer and the
railroad company during the project's construction phase), and a climate
control agreement (specifies the climactic requirements that the
developers must observe during construction).
Negotiations between the SSRC and the city of Stockholm produced
a town plan agreement in which the details of the ownership, operation,
maintenance, management, and regulation of the bus terminal are
specified. The agreement also contains the details of a complicated
land exchange between the railroad company and the city. (Refer to
Diagram 1.) In exchange for the street improvements, valued at 108 m
Skr, that are a part of the Vasaterminalen project and for which the
SSRC is paying through foregone lease income, the city of Stockholm has
agreed to reimburse the railroad company the investment costs through
the transfer of 93 million Skr in state grants for municipal road and
bridge improvements, and the ownership rights to 15 million Skr worth of
city-owned land. The land is located adjacent to the Central Station
and will be used to accommodate the Vasaterminalen project.
Moreover, numerous negotiations took place among the private
participants- -contractors and subcontractors- -to the project, including
the contractor's consortium, Konsortiet Terminalbyggarna, which is
jointly owned by two private contractors- -SIAB (67 percent) and L.E.
Lundbergbyggen KB. (33 percent); the project architects--ARKEN arkiteker
AB, Ralph Erskine arkiteker/planner AB, and Tengboms arkitekontor AB via
AET arkiteker; the structural, heating, and ventilating engineers--
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Terminalkonstruktorerna Arne Johnson-SIAB AB, Hugo Theorells ing byra
AB; and the electrical engineers--Folke Johansson ing byra AB.
By the fall of 1988, more than two years after the'research into
the Vasaterminalen project was conducted, there was evidence suggesting
that the project had been a qualified success. The project had been
successful in that it brought together members of the public and private
sectors and combined their comparative advantages to devise and
implement a solution to an old problem. Transportation facilities that
have been needed but not affordable for many years were virtually
completed. Thus, from the perspective of relieving the effects of
public sector fiscal constraints of infrastructure provision processes,
the Vasaterminalen appears to have been successful.
This success is, however, subject to qualification. By 1988,
much of the office complex had not been let, and there was some concern
that perhaps office space is not the best use of the deck property.
Apparently, other office facilities located on the outskirts of
Stockholm are far more attractively priced than the Vasaterminalen
complex. In order to minimize their losses, the developers have chosen
to alter the use of part of the complex. It will be used, on a
temporary basis, to house hotel facilities. Nevertheless, in light of
the apparent success of the Vasaterminalen project in making private
funds available for public works projects, it is likely to serve as a
positive precedent in the future development of Swedish privatization.
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A Critique of Swedish Privatization As Illustrated
in the Vasaterminalen Project
In this final section of the chapter, we conduct a brief analysis
of the Vasaterminalen project to determine the extent to which the
infrastructure facilities are, indeed, privately financed, and to
identify some of the projects distributional effects, as well as
characteristics of its economic legislative, and administrative context.
Four years ago, during the earliest stages of the research for
this study, our inquiries into Swedish-style privatization invariably
(though not exclusively) led us to the Vasaterminalen project. A close
analysis of the project suggests, however, that although it is, to some
extent, illustrative of the way in which private funds (and other
resources) may be allocated to infrastructure projects in Sweden, it has
a very strong public finance component, as well.
Recall, once again, that we have defined private finance as
finance in which costs are allocated on the basis of the benefit
principle; finance in which there is no cross-subsidization between
different levels of beneficiaries or between beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries. Conversely, public finance is finance in which there
is cross-subsidization. Taxes, user charges, and other sources of
finance in which costs are allocated uniformly irrespective of the
incidence of the benefits for which they pay constitute forms of public
finance.
The infrastructure that constitutes the Vasaterminalen project
has, to an extent, been privately financed. The private developers have
and will continue to benefit from the infrastructure. The deck serves
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as the physical foundation for their office complex; the electric power
station will provide the energy required to operate the complex; and the
transportation facilities will ensure the complex's excellent
accessibility. The developers have borne roughly half of the
infrastructure investment costs by financing the design and construction
costs. There remains, however, a very large public finance component,
because the balance of the investment costs are being financed out of
the proceeds of the SSRC's future lease income. To the extent that the
Vasaterminalen project is illustrative, it suggests that Swedish
privatization is characterized by considerable "publicness;" that is, it
has a significant public component.
Considering, however, that the infrastructure financed in the
Vasaterminalen project will serve the public, as well as the private,
sector, from the perspective of the benefit principle of distributional
(upon which we have based our definition of private finance), perhaps
the financing should, indeed, have a substantial public component. It
would, however, be interesting to know if there are cases in Sweden, as
in the United States, in which private funds are used exclusively to
finance infrastructure projects that provide general or public benefits
as well as private benefits. (Then, of course, the implicit cross-
subsidy--the public benefits from the facilities without contributing to
their costs--raises the issue of whether such an arrangement is indeed
private finance, too.)
The Vasaterminalen project seems to have significant
distributional effects. Our observation is based on the assumption
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that, in general, private funds and other resources tend to be allocated
where the return to them is greatest; therefore, a large part of the
success that the SREO and the SSRC had in attracting private resources
to the infrastructure investments can be attributed to their location--
Stockholm's central business district, which is one of the most
economically strong regions in Sweden. Therefore, we maintain that
through the allocation of financial resources to the strengthening of
Stockholm's infrastructure network, the Vasaterminalen project is likely
to have reinforced and perhaps exacerbated established regional economic
inequalities.
Moreover, the successful solicitation of private funds to the
infrastructure investments is likely also to be attributable to the type
of development project involved--an office complex, the occupants of
which are relatively more likely to be able to support added financial
costs associated with developer-financed infrastructure. Infrastructure
investments linked to a proposed development of rent-controlled
residential development, for instance, might not have attracted the
magnitude of private investor interest that the Vasaterminalen project
apparently did. We suggest, therefore, that the allocation of private
financial resources to infrastructure projects in Sweden is not only
likely to reinforce and exacerbate established regional economic
inequalities, but also inequalities among economic sectors. To the
extent that the Vasaterminalen project is reflective of other
privatization projects, privatization in Sweden is likely to reinforce
and/or exacerbate established economic imbalances.
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A third observation regarding the Vasaterminalen project it that
it is clearly a product of its economic context. It is a project the
impetus for which was provided by persistent public-sector fiscal
constraints. According to people we interviewed, the traffic congestion
problems around the Stockholm Central Station area first became apparent
sometime during the 1950s, and its technical solution--the construction
of a deck over the railyard on which the bus terminal could be located--
was devised during the 1960s. Government fiscal constraints, however,
prevented the implementation of the solution for approximately two
decades. It was not until the early 1980s, when the long-needed
infrastructure investments were presented in such a way as to attract
private financial resources, that the solution was implemented. Thus,
we maintain that government fiscal constraints appear to have been an
important factor in encouraging the use of private funds for
infrastructure.
Another observation we made is that although the infrastructure
improvements were postponed for many years, during the course of our
interviews, very few people indicated that the postponement constituted
much more than a public inconvenience; that is, the postponements appear
to have posed no impending threat to public health, safety, and welfare.
Furthermore, the financial arrangements by which the infrastructure is
being paid for calls for considerable public participation in the form
of 20 years of SSRC's lease income, which suggests that the government's
fiscal constraints may not be entirely structural, that they will ease,
to some extent, in the long-run so that the public sector will be able
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to resume its traditional role in the financing of infrastructure
investments. This would suggest that, at least in the past, Swedish
privatization, as reflected by the Vasaterminalen case, constitutes a
policy response to more of a short-term, cash-flow fiscal problem and
than a long-term, structural fiscal problem.
A key element of the legislative framework of the Vasaterminalen
project is Tomtratt--the old and well-established law governing the use
of the land-lease system. Our information suggests that the
Vasaterminalen project constitutes a recently evolved, innovative, and
liberal reinterpretation of the law, and that this reinterpretation
provides an important legal basis for some privatization in Sweden.
We do not, however, want to overemphasize the importance of
Tomtratt as the legal basis of Swedish privatization. It is not the
only, or even the most important, legislative basis for Swedish
privatization. It is a key element of a broader legislative framework.
There are other laws, too, which comprise the framework. In those
cases, for instance, in which the private developer owns or purchases
land for development purposes, other laws are relevant. Moreover, there
is legislation pending that, if adopted, will also help to shape the
legislative framework for privatization in Sweden. There is a proposal,
for instance, to legalize toll roads, which are currently illegal in
Sweden. If the legislation passes, a new avenue for privatization will
open. A group of private developers (the Osterleden project) has
already indicated that they could construct a part of a major highway
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that will encircle the city of Stockholm and could recoup their costs by
charging toll fees of motorists who use the road.
Tomtratt is important in that it is a key element of the
legislative framework of the Vasaterminalen project--a project which is
considered to be important and precedent-setting with respect to Swedish
privatization. Most municipalities do, however, sell rather than lease
their land, and this practice has increased in recent years as a result
of fiscal problems (Cars and Jirlow, 1987, p. 20). Thus, Tomtratt is
not so very widely applied, but it is important because it serves as a
principle element of the legal foundation for an important privatization
endeavor in Sweden.
Finally, we observe that the public sector played a major role in
the administration of the Vasaterminalen project from its inception to
its completion. Various public authorities were responsible for
identifying the technical and financial solutions to the Central Station
problem, defining, soliciting, guiding, and monitoring private
participation in the implementation of those solutions so as to ensure
that the completed project would be of a high quality and consistent
with established social welfare, economic, and environmental objectives.
Sweden's is a strong formal planning system in which the public
sector plays a major role. Municipal acquisition and ownership of large
amounts of "developable" land and various laws and regulations have,
traditionally, enabled strict public control to occur over land use and
development activities (Anas, et al., 1987, p. 38). Historically,
therefore, the initiative for development activities have lain with the
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public sector. In many such cases, such as the Vasaterminalen project,
the public sector, therefore, does play an important administrative
role. In an increasing number of cases, the public sector's role in the
development processes has been blunted by private developers going
directly to and negotiating with the communities likely to be affected
by their development proposals (Harsman, 1986). There appears to be a
trend toward negotiations preceding, rather than following, officially
established land-use, planning, and development procedures.
One concern we heard on several occasions during the course of
our interviews was that, as privatization develops as a concept and is
applied more frequently, it could result in the weakening of the potency
of planners, official land use, and development control procedures as
private investors and other parties increasingly seek to by-pass
planners, to circumvent official land use and development procedures,
and to negotiate directly with the communities likely to be affected by
their proposals. This reflects a general bureaucratic concern regarding
how far privatization is likely to go in shaping and controlling Swedish
development processes. Thus, who actually takes the initiative in the
development process is likely to influence the role of the public sector
in privatization projects. If, as official policy dictates, the public
sector effectively maintains the right to initiate development (as in
the Vasaterminalen project), it will continue to exert its crucial
influence on privatization projects. If, however, private developers
are allowed to continue to initiate negotiations with communities, and,
to the extent that, as a result, official planning, land use, and
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development procedures and processes are circumvented, the role of the
public sector in privatization projects may diminish.
In summary, to the extent that Vasaterminalen is reflective of
Swedish privatization, we conclude that the use of private funds for
infrastructure is complemented by a large public component, is likely to
exacerbate or, at least, reinforce regional economic and sectoral
investment inequalities, and has been encouraged by government fiscal
constraints. Furthermore, a salient characteristic of the legislative
framework for Swedish appears to be a liberal interpretation of
established law, such as Tomtratt and other laws, as well as pending
legislation. Finally, to the extent that official planning, land-use,
and development policy is observed, successful Swedish privatization
requires substantive bureaucratic support.
CHAPTER 5
USE OF PRIVATE FUNDS FOR TRANSPORTATION
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN
In Chapter 2, we presented two theoretical/policy perspectives on
how to overcome market inefficiency in the allocation of resources
required for the provision of infrastructure. According to the theory
of market failure, market inefficiency is most effectively overcome
through a policy of government intervention--regulation and/or direct
involvement--into infrastructure provision processes. Alternatively,
according to the theory of property rights, market inefficiency is most
effectively overcome through a policy of structuring the ownership
rights to the requisite resources so that they are privately held.
Theoretical Perspectives
Although the theories provide us with some insight into possible
policy solutions to the problem of inefficient market allocation of
resources required for the provision of infrastructure, they reveal
little with respect to the particular circumstances under which the
policies are operable. What the theories do not reflect, for instance,
and what we propose, is that the decision to adopt one policy solution
or the other or some combination of both is a complex decision that is a
function of numerous variables. We propose, further, that among the
chief determining variables are the distributional objectives and
underlying distributional principles of public finance policy of the
implementing body. Thus, the policy prescribed under the theory of
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property rights--the establishment of private rights of ownership to the
financial and other resource inputs--is most likely to be implemented in
those public finance policy contexts characterized by a relatively
strong orientation toward the benefit principle of distributional
equity. The policy prescribed under the theory of market failure--
government intervention into, that is, the use of public financial and
other resources, infrastructure provision--is most likely to be applied
in those public finance policy contexts characterized by a relatively
strong orientation toward the ability-to-pay principle of distributional
equity. Moreover, the extent to which one policy is relied upon more
than the other will depend on the relative importance of the two
distributional principles, which, in turn, will be a function of the
specific distributional objectives of public finance policy of the
implementing body--national, regional, or local government. We will use
our discussion of the use of private funds for transportation
infrastructure in the United States and Sweden to clarify and support
our proposition. We will also use the discussion to illuminate some of
the other variables that influence the policy response to inefficient
market provision of infrastructure.
In our analyses of the use of private funds for infrastructure
projects in the United States and Sweden, we noted that private finance,
in its pure form, is rare. In each of the examples provided, there are
public finance or cross-subsidy effects. In some cases, the effects are
greater than in others. This point--that, in practice, pure private
finance is rare--having been established, we suggest that the use of
private financial resources for infrastructure needs has been relatively
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more pervasive in the United States than in Sweden, in recent years. A
clear trend toward greater use of private resources for infrastructure
needs is present in Sweden, but the evolution has, to date, not advanced
as far as in the United States, even considering differences such as
populations and land mass. In this final discussion, we identify some
of the factors that might underlie this difference. In doing so, we
highlight some of the important factors that shape the policy approach
to market failure in the provision of infrastructure, and, in
particular, the circumstances under which a privatization policy is
implemented as part of that approach. We begin our discussion with the
role of distributional objectives and underlying distributional
principles of public finance policy. These factors appear, on the basis
of our analysis of U.S. and Swedish privatization, to play a significant
role in shaping the policy approach to market failure in the provision
of infrastructure.29
Distributional Objectives and Principles
A recently emerging objective of U.S. public finance policy is an
equitable intergenerational distribution of infrastructure provision
costs. 3 0 When we refer to the intergenerational distribution of
29For a brief list of some of the other factors that shape the policy
response to the provision of infrastructure, see Humplick, et al. 1990, pp. 9-
12.
30The emergence has been gradual over the years. It actually began
several decades ago with the development of special-assessment districts
through which private developers were required to pay for infrastructure that
specially benefited their development projects. The emergence of this
objective has, however, been most apparent in recent years.
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infrastructure costs, we are referring to the allocation of costs across
generations of infrastructure users. The emergence of this objective
underlies the recent evolution in the distributional principles
influencing U.S. public finance policy to reflect a greater emphasis
today than in earlier years on the benefit principle of distributional
equity. The increased emphasis on the benefit principle of
distributional equity in U.S. public finance policy is reflected in a
growing reliance on private funds and other resources in the provision
of infrastructure.
In the United States, in recent years, public finance policy has
become increasingly influenced by the objective of intergenerational
equity, and the pursuit of this objective is an important factor
underlying the relatively more frequent use of private funds to finance
infrastructure in the United States. This objective has been sought
through a policy of distributing infrastructure costs among beneficiary
populations in proportions to the benefits they receive rather than
among the general public. Imlicit in this policy is the benefit
principle of distributional equity. The emergence in importance of
the benefit principle is linked to the distributional effects of
traditional public finance.
Under traditional public finance policy, the incidence of
infrastructure costs is shared intergenerationally: any generation of
infrastructure users benefits from facilities financed by orevious
generations and finances many of the facilities that will benefit future
generations. This structure of cost distribution creates equity
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problems when there is rapid growth and development. Under conditions
of rapid growth and development, the need for infrastructure also
increases rapidly. Traditional public finance forces the current
generation of users to bear the associated costs through great and
sometimes exorbitant increases in their utility rates, user charges,
fees, and taxes, etc. This has given rise to a broadly held concern
regarding the equity of traditional public financing of infrastructure
when there is rapid growth and development. This concern has been
expressed in questions such as:
To what extent does the current generation of users have a
responsibility to future generations for providing
infrastructure, since much of the infrastructure used by
the current generation was provided by previous
generations, and when does that responsibility to future
generations become excessive because of rapid
growth, .... who should pay the increases over time in the
unit cost of infrastructure that traditionally has been
publicly financed ... (who should assume) financial
responsibility for unused excess capacity of public
facilities that are constructed to accommodate future
growth? (Snyder and Stegman, 1986, p. 29).
There are no definitive answers to these questions, but there are
emerging opinions to the effect that the limit has been reached on
traditional sources of revenues for infrastructure and other
historically public responsibilities,31 that the current generation of
infrastructure users should not be unduly burdened by the costs of
facilities required to serve future generations, and that all
generations of infrastructure users--current and future--should pay
3 1This opinion is reflected in legislative changes such as Proposition 13
in California and Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts. It is also reflected in
a general trend toward greater electoral resistance to increases in taxes,
bond issues, and other traditional sources of public revenue.
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their "fair" share of facility and service costs. Increasingly, "fair"
share is being defined in terms of "benefits received." In an effort to
achieve a more "fair" distribution of infrastructure costs across
generations of users, in recent years, there has been a move toward
distributing the costs among generations of users in accordance with
"benefits received" from the facilities. In other words, there has been
an evolution in U.S. infrastructure finance policy toward greater
application of the benefit principle of distributional equity and,
thereby, the greater use of private financial resources in the provision
of infrastructure.
This is in contrast to the situation in Sweden where,
traditionally, a chief public finance policy objective has been the
redistribution of nominal incomes to achieve a more equitable
distribution of real income among Swedish citizens. One manifestation
of the seriousness of this objective is the country's tax and transfer
system. Through a comparatively progressive personal income tax system
and comprehensive transfer system, Swedish real incomes are equalized
considerably, relative to nominal incomes (Gramlich, 1987, pp. 250-288).
The progressivity of the income tax system is evidenced by
marginal tax rate and personal income figures for 1985. In that year,
incomes as low as 70,200 Skr ($10,000) were taxed; the rate was 4
percent. Incomes valued at 124,800 Skr ($18,000) were taxed at 25
percent; and 50 percent of incomes valued at 351,000 Skr ($50,000) or
above were taxed. Combined with local income taxes, the marginal
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personal income tax rate was as high as 70 percent for incomes of
$50,000 (Burtless, 1987, pp. 188-189).
In exchange for their high tax payments, Swedes enjoy a
comprehensive (by U.S. standards) social welfare system, which transfers
benefits, allowances, subsidies, facilities, etc. to all Swedish
households regardless of nominal income level. The combined result of
the tax and transfer systems is a redistribution of nominal income that
bears little correlation to the pre-tax and transfer distribution--a
real income distribution that is considerably more equitable.
The extent to which the Swedish tax and transfer system
redistributes and equalizes income is suggested in the results of
analysis conducted by Swedish economist, Assar Lindbeck. His work shows
that the ratio of factor income between households in the tenth and
second decile is reduced from sixty-six to one prior to taxes and
transfers to four to one after taxes and transfers (cited in Gramlich,
1987, p. 257).
This commitment to income redistribution suggests that, at least
in the recent past, the ability-to-pay principle of distributional
equity has exerted a relatively greater influence on Swedish public
finance policy than the benefit principle. Recall from our discussion
in Chapter 2 that application of the ability-to-pay principle in public
finance policy results in a redistribution of income, because those with
greater income contribute more to public service and facility costs than
those with lesser income, and the former, thereby, transfers some of
their income to the latter. The ability-to-pay principle is clearly
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evident in the progressivity of the Swedish personal income tax system
and the effectiveness with which it is reallocated through the transfer
system, as evidenced by findings such as Lindbeck's. We maintain,
therefore, that a principal factor underlying the relatively less
pervasive use of private funds for infrastructure in Sweden in the past
is the importance of the public finance policy objective of the
redistribution of nominal income to achieve a vertically equitable
distribution of real income and the implicitly greater emphasis on the
ability-to-pay principle of distributional equity relative to the
benefit principle. We maintain, further, that the lack of sufficient
redistributional effects obtainable through application of the benefit
principle underlies its relatively modest importance in Swedish public
finance policy in the past, and therefore, the relative modest use of
private funds and other resources in infrastructure provision process in
the past.
The distributional effects of privatization merit serious
consideration. 32  Consider the following argument. When the provision
of goods and services are financed with private funds, their consumption
is dependent upon payment for them, which is, in turn, dependent upon
income. Thus, higher-income groups are likely to have better access to
privately financed goods and services than lower income groups. As
high-income groups increasingly defect to privatized goods and services,
32 The distributional effects of privatization policy are a serious issue
that are alone worthy of considerable investigative analysis. The principal
question is: How are the needs of populations that cannot pay for the benefits
met?
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the concentration of low-income groups consuming publicly financed goods
and services increases, making it increasingly difficult to generate the
financial resources required to ensure their optimal provision.
Consequently, the provision of publicly financed goods and services
becomes suboptimal. At the same time, the high concentration of high-
income consumers of privately financed goods and services ensures the
adequacy of financial resources required for their optimal provision.
What results is a two-tier system of goods and services--one tier of
optimally provided privately (and well) financed goods and services,
which are consumed by high-income groups, and another tier of sub-
optimally provided publicly (poorly) financed goods and services, which
serve low-income groups. Privatization appears to reinforce and perhaps
worsen existing economic inequalities. That private financing of
infrastructure reinforces or worsens existing economic inequalities is
supported by our observations made with regard to the distributional
effects of privatization in the United States and Sweden. We noted that
in both cases, private resources appear to be allocated to those
regions, user populations, and economic sectors characterized by their
relative economic strength, and that, consequently, privatization
appears to reinforce or exacerbate existing economic inequalities.33
33We have argued here that privatization policy appears to reinforce or
exacerbate economic inequalities through its bias toward regions, economic
sectors, and user populations characterized by relative economic strength. It
is possible, however, that privatization policy could reduce economic
inequality; by reducing the need for public funds in wealthier areas, it could
enable more public funds to be allocated to depressed regions.
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In addition to the distributional objectives and the relative
importance of different principles of distributional equity in public
finance policy, we maintain that, at least, the following three other
variables exert an influence on the policy response to the market's
inefficiency in the allocation of resources for the provision of
infrastructure: (1) the extent to which government is fiscally
constrained, (2) the extent to which government is capable (willing) to
manage a privatization process and policy, and (3) the extent to which
there is legislative accommodation to the privatization concept. We
base our findings on our observations of privatization of infrastructure
financing in the United States and Sweden. We will conclude that
differences in these variables underlie the differences in the use of
private funds and other private resources for infrastructure in the
United States and Sweden in recent years. We will use this conclusion
as the basis of our final general observation regarding the
circumstances under which private funds and other private resources are
likely to be allocated to infrastructure needs.
Government Fiscal Constraints
In recent years, both the U.S. and Swedish governments have faced
serious fiscal constraints. In the early 1970s, the U.S. economy began
to experience what would become a decade-long period of decline;
national productivity and income fell, inflation, public spending, and
government deficits increased, in some instances, to historically
unprecedented levels; and by the end of the decade, the economy was in
recession. All levels of government were experiencing serious
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difficulty in maintaining their financial commitment to the provision of
infrastructure (Vaughan, 1984, pp. ix-x, 3-4). The Swedish economy
underwent a similar transformation--decreases in national productivity,
and increases in inflation, public consumption, foreign borrowing, and
public budget deficit (Rivlin, 1987). In both countries, economic
circumstances have encouraged public finance policy makers to seek
financial and other forms of support from the private sector for
activities, such as the provision of infrastructure, normally undertaken
exclusively by the public sector.
In the United States, however, the fiscal constraints appear to
have been relatively more restrictive, as evidenced by the impending and
actual compromise to public health, safety, and welfare that resulted
from postponed and cancelled expenditures (Gakenheimer, 1985; Vaughan,
1984, Choate and Walter, 1981; and Grossman, 1979). In such a context,
the incentive to allocate private resources to infrastructure projects
is considerable. This, we argue, is in contrast to the situation in
Sweden where the postponement and cancellation of projects has not
threatened public health, safety, and welfare to the same extent.
Perhaps the relative newness of Swedish infrastructure systems, combined
with the relatively less intense demands placed on them by the smaller
and less-concentrated Swedish population, have contributed to this
(Burger, interview, 1988). Whatever the reasons, the Swedish government
appears not to have faced the same magnitude of fiscal constraints as
the U.S. government in financing infrastructure and, in the past, has,
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therefore, had relatively less incentive to encourage greater use of
private resources in the provision of infrastructure.
Moreover, U.S. public finance policy appears to be responding to
structural fiscal constraints. The current trend toward greater private
sector involvement in public finance policy suggests that government
cannot maintain, nor in the near future resume, its traditional and
almost exclusive financial responsibility for the provision of
infrastructure. This change is a result of the combined effect of the
emergence of serious fiscal constraints and changes in spending
priorities, such as the recent growth in public expenditures on
environmental programs. Together, they call for a fundamental and
permanent reorientation in U.S. public finance away from reliance on the
government toward a greater role for the private sector in financing
infrastructure. Thus, the structural quality of U.S. government fiscal
constraints combined with their restrictiveness as manifest in systems
breakdowns and threats to public health, safety and welfare have
provided compelling incentives to increase the use of private funds and
other resources in the provision of infrastructure.
Conversely, Swedish public finance policy, until very recently,
aDpears to have been responding to fiscal constraints that were
relatively more transitory than those faced by U.S. governments. An
outside observer was left with the impression that once the government's
austerity and other economic adjustment programs had taken effect. the
government's fiscal constraints would ease and allow it to resume it
traditional role as exclusive provider of infrastructure finance. Under
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circumstances such as these, the need for fundamental and permanent
reorientation of public finance policy to include an expanded private
sector role, does not seem warranted.
The point that we are trying to make (without being too
presumptuous) is that, in the past, Swedish policy makers seemed to have
viewed the public sector's fiscal constraints as transitory and not
warranting a radical or permanent reorientation in infrastructure
financing policy toward greater use of private resources. This point is
supported in a closer analysis of the financing interactions of the
Vasaterminalen project. Recall that the facilities are being financed
with the proceeds of a loan received by the Swedish State Railroad
Company (SSRC) from the developers--Vasaterminalen, AB. Recall,
further, that the SSRC is amortizing the loan by forgiving 20 years of
lease income that would, otherwise, accrue to it. Thus, the
infrastructure is actually being financed by the public sector through
the SSRC's lease revenue. This financial arrangement suggests that,
unlike in the United States, there remains, in Sweden, a strong
confidence in the long-term fiscal capacity of the public sector. The
arrangement suggests that although the government cannot bear the
facilities' investment costs today, it will be able to bear the costs,
as well as the costs of maintenance and operation, in the future.
Moreover, it suggests that the recent use of private funds for
infrastructure might be a solution to a short-term cash flow problem
rather than a long-term, structural fiscal problem. We suggest, then,
that the past perception that the public sector's fiscal constraints
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were of a transitory nature has also contributed to the relatively
limited role of the private sector in Swedish public finance policy in
recent years.
Administrative Role of the Public Sector
Our analysis of the use of private funds for infrastructure
projects in the United States and Sweden also suggests that the public
sector plays an important role in the administration of privatization
policy and projects. This observation suggests to us that to the extent
that government is (in)capable of undertaking administrative
responsibility, private resources are (less) more likely to be allocated
to infrastructure needs.
In both countries, the public sector plays an indispensable role
in the administration of private funds to infrastructure projects. The
public sector, typically, identifies prospective privatization projects;
i.e. it identifies infrastructure needs and creates financial strategies
of public-private cooperation with which to meet those needs. Moreover,
it guides private participation in the projects to ensure that, when
complete, they are consistent with established plans, land-use and
development objectives, and social and economic welfare goals.
Yet, there is bureaucratic uneasiness with the concept of
privatization in both the United States and Sweden. In Chapter 4, we
described how on several occasions in Sweden, the view was put forth
that privatization might weaken the potency of planners and official
land-use and development control processes and procedures; and that this
process has already begun in cases in which private developers have
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bypassed planners and circumvented official land-use and development
control procedures, and negotiated directly with the communities that
stand to be affected by their projects. Although this sort of
bureaucratic distrust of privatization exists in both the United States
and Sweden, it appears to be stronger in Sweden, perhaps because of the
relative size and power of the Swedish public sector in the national
economy (i.e., it employs a large percentage of the working force and is
highly unionized). We conclude that the relatively limited use of
private resources in Swedish public finance policy might also be
attributable to the lack of bureaucratic support for the concept.
It is worth mentioning here though that the U.S. experience with
privatization suggests that, contrary to the view expressed above,
planning, land-use, and development control bodies play a critical and
indispensable role in the administration of privatization projects--a
role that cannot be easily usurped by members of the private sector.
Most importantly, the public sector provides the guidance needed to
ensure that development and infrastructure provision processes proceed
in a logical and coordinated manner, and in a manner that is consistent
with economic and social welfare objectives. The U.S. experience
suggests that privatization is a partnership; both sectors are necessary
to ensure its success.
Legislative Context For Privatization Policy
The policy choice of allocating private funds and other resources
to infrastructure projects is also a function of the degree to which
there has been legislative accommodation to the privatization concept;
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that is, the degree to which the established laws and legal principles
have been altered and/or reinterpreted to accommodate the privatization
concept. In the United States, where private funds have been used to
finance virtually every type of infrastructure, established laws and
legal principles governing the financing of infrastructure have been
liberalized considerably. Early statutory and case law restricted the
use of private funds to local facilities. In recent years, the laws
have been liberalized so that private funds have been used to finance
general facilities, as well.
In Sweden, too, there has been legislative accommodation to the
privatization concept. Liberal interpretation of an established law is
reflected in the adapted application of the Tomtratt law--its
unconventional application to property expressly created for Tomtratt
application. Furthermore, there is a proposal to alter the legislative
context further to enable the construction of toll roads, which are
currently illegal in Sweden. Such legislation would open the door for
numerous other privatization projects such as the Osterleden project.
Despite some degree of legislative accommodation to the
privatization concept in Sweden, the process appears to have not gone as
far as it has in the United States. In the United States, over a period
that began more than 50 years ago with the expanded use of special-
assessments to finance local public works, established laws and legal
principles have been gradually and consistently broadened,
reinterpreted, and adapted to the financial needs of infrastructure
systems, so that, today, the legislative framework for infrastructure
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finance has enabled extensive private-sector participation in many
aspects of the provision of many types of infrastructure.
In Sweden, legislative changes regarding land use, development,
and others such factors that affect infrastructure provision policy are
rarely altered in comparison to such legislative changes in the United
States (Anas, et al. 1987, p. 39). This is reflected in the extent to
which legislative changes have been made to accommodate privatization in
Sweden. To date the changes appear to have been limited mainly to a new
interpretation of an existing law. Consequently, the legal parameters
for the implementation of a Swedish privatization policy has not yet
been substantially liberalized and have been relatively restricted.
This we maintain is another factor that underlies the relatively limited
use of private funds and other resources for infrastructure in Sweden in
the past.
Conclusions
In Chapter 2, we concluded that the theoretical discussion
regarding the correction of market failure in the provision of
infrastructure falls short in that neither theory--market failure or
property rights--is particularly insightful with respect to the context
in which one policy prescription or the other--government intervention
or the establishment of private property rights--is likely to be
applied. We have attempted to fill this void in the theory by
identifying some of the factors influential is the determination of the
extent to which private funds (and other resources as prescribed under
the theory of property rights) are likely to be allocated to
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infrastructure projects, and conversely, when public resources are more
likely to be relied upon, as prescribed under the theory of market
failure. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the use of private
financial resources in the infrastructure provision in the United States
and Sweden--countries in which recent infrastructure provision policy
has, to date, been characterized by very different balances of public
and private sector participation--, we conclude that, at least, the
following factors are determinant.
First, the distributional objectives and underlying principles of
public finance policy appear to be among the most important variables.
We support our conclusion with the observation that in the United
States, where recent public finance policy has been characterized by the
emerging importance of the allocating the intergenerational incidence of
infrastructure costs on the basis of the benefit principle of
distributional equity, private funds and other resources have been
allocated to infrastructure projects relatively more frequently than in
Sweden, where, in the recent past, public financial policy has been
characterized by a relatively stronger commitment to income
redistribution and vertical income equality achieved through the
application of the ability-to-pay principle of distributional equity.
Second, we conclude that the degree to which government fiscal
constraints are restrictive and structural is also an important factor
in the determination of the extent to which private resources are
allocated to infrastructure projects. We support this point through our
observation that, in the United States, where government fiscal
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constraints have been sufficiently restrictive to force the cancellation
and postponement of projects necessary to protect public health, safety,
and welfare, and where, furthermore, the public policy makers appear to
view the constraints as structural, suggesting the need for a permanent
reorientation in infrastructure finance policy, private funds have been
relatively more frequently used to finance infrastructure. In Sweden,
where government fiscal constraints have, in the past, been relatively
less restrictive and policy makers viewed them as more transitory than
structural, private funds been used relatively less frequently to
finance infrastructure.
Third, we conclude that because of the importance of public-
sector administrative guidance in privatization projects, to the extent
that such guidance is not forthcoming, private resources may not be
allocated as frequently to infrastructure projects. This point we
support through our observation that, in Sweden, where the public sector
is relatively large and politically powerful, bureaucratic reticence to
encourage the implementation of privatization projects (also evident in
their U.S. counterparts, but of less significance and impact because
they are relatively smaller and less powerful) might have, in the past,
blunted the development and implementation of a Swedish privatization
policy as compared to its U.S. counterpart.
Fourth, we conclude that legislative support is also an important
factor in the determination of the extent to which private funds are
allocated to infrastructure projects. In the United States, where
established laws and legal principles governing the use of private funds
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for infrastructure have been liberalized gradually, consistently, and
considerably over the years, private funds are relatively more
frequently allocated to infrastructure projects than in Sweden where
there has been relatively less legal liberalization.
We do not mean to imply that these are the only or even the most
important variables determining the policy response to market failure in
the provision of infrastructure, or more narrowly, the extent to which
private financial resources are allocated to infrastructure projects.
They are variables that are apparent to us on the basis of our
comparative analysis of privatization in the United States and Sweden.
Other variables, such as the institutional framework for planning and
development, the political context, demographics, industrial change, and
other spending priorities shape the policy response to infrastructure
provision and could provide the basis of other studies.
APPENDIX 1
My general idea for this study was conceived early in 1986,
during the initial stages of a research project that was conducted in
Sweden at the Stockholm Regional Planning and Economic Development
Office (RPO) and funded by the Swedish Council for Building Research.
The study is based on research and analysis I conducted over the
succeeding three-year period.
The study passed through four distinct phases. In the first
stage, I developed of a basic understanding of the theoretical framework
for the analysis of the relative roles of the public and private sector
in the provision of transportation infrastructure. I focused on two
prominent theoretical perspectives that address this issue--the theory
of market failure and the theory of property rights. Guidance at this
early stage of the study was provided by Karen R. Polenske, Professor of
Regional Political Economy and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT); Bjdrn Harsman, Director of Research at the RPO;
Hans Wijkander, Professor of Public Finance at Stockholm University; and
Jerome Rothenberg, Professor of Economics at MIT. Subsequent input was
provided by Folke Snickars, Professor of Regional Planning at the Royal
Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm.
In the second stage, I collected information regarding U.S. and
Swedish privatization in order to develop an understanding of the
privatization concept and its applications within the context of
infrastructure provision. Physical distance from the United States
meant that I had to collect much of the U.S. data during short visits to
the United States, and that I gathered most of the information from
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secondary sources--public and quasi-public documents, journals,
consultant's reports, published and unpublished results of research
conducted by academics, research institutions, and private development
firms--in the libraries of academic and other research institutions
located in Cambridge, Massachusetts and Washington, D.C.
I conducted the first six months of research in Sweden. During
that time, I was able to conduct relatively more intensive primary
research. Because language limitations were considerable, I could not
easily use written primary materials without translation. The Swedish
land lease legislation and much of the material regarding the specific
case that is the focus of Chapter 4 was translated from Swedish into
English for my use. Most of the other information provided on Sweden in
Chapter 4 is based on conversations with the staff of the RPO and other
public agencies--Alfred Kanis and Karin Stahlberg of the Ministry of
Finance, and Ulf Torngren and Johan Nystrom from the Ministry of
Transport and Communications, and Jan-Eric Nilsson of the Swedish Road
Authority. Goran Carlen, a graduate student at KTH, shared with me the
preliminary results of some of his research on Swedish infrastructure
systems.
Interviews with the staff of public and private organizations
also provided me with considerable information on Swedish privatization.
Hans Wohlin, the Executive Director of the Stockholm City Planning
Authority; Bo Wijkmark, Director of the RPO; G~ran Tegner, Research
Leader/Transport Sector for the Stockholm Traffic Office; Bo Carlsund,
Director of the Planning and Budgetary Office at the Ministry of
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Transport and Communications; and Sune Jussil, Director of the Housing
Finance Institute each provided information considerable and helpful
information. I also conducted interviews with staff at the Stockholm
Real Estate Office--Per-Hakan Westin, engineer, and Bengt Satorius,
chief project engineer; and the Director of Vasaterminalen A.B.--Eric
Engstrom. The information they provided was crucial to me in the
Chapter 4 presentation of the Vasaterminalen project. Per Olof
Sahlstrom, Chief Project Engineer of the Osterleden Project, an
important proposed privatization project, was also very helpful. All of
the conversations and interviews took place in Sweden, between February,
1986, and September, 1988. I also gathered a lot of information through
feedback from a series of preliminary presentations of the study results
in Sweden. I made presentations at the Seventh European Advanced Summer
Institute in Regional Science at Umea University in Sweden (June, 1986),
a Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) seminar (September, 1986), a
meeting of the Board of Directors of the Swedish Council for Building
Research (October, 1987), and an RPO seminar (August, 1988).
In the third stage, I organized vast amounts of data concerning
U.S. and Swedish privatization efforts. For the United States, this was
a tremendous task because although privatization is a relatively well-
developed and widely implemented policy, very little work has been done
to systematize and document the concept and its applications in a
comprehensive and consistent manner. For Sweden, this third step was
relatively less complicated because, the concept had not, to date, been
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developed and implemented on as broad a scale as it had been in the
United States.
In the fourth stage, I examined selected privatization projects
in the two countries to ascertain some of the factors underlying the
differences in degrees to which the privatization concept has been
developed and implemented in the United States and Sweden in recent
years. This information, I hope, will be of aid to policy makers
contemplating the adoption of privatization policy as a fiscal tool to
aid in the provision of infrastructure in their national, regional, or
local contexts.
APPENDIX 2
Summary Outline--U.S. Privatization
Finance Principle: Infrastructure cost allocation on the basis of the
benefit principle of distributional equity
I. Linkage of infrastructure financing procedures with
land use control and development regulation
processes; legal criteria--rational nexus
(reasonable relationship) between financing provided
and the infrastructure needs created by financier
A. Developer Exactions: in-kind contributions to
infrastructure systems
1) Traditional: statutorily fixed; limits private
funding to highly on-site and other highly
localized facilities
2) Negotiated: subject to negotiation on a
case-by-case basis; private funding for
facilities that confer general benefits;
B. Development Fees: monetary contributions to
the costs of infrastructure systems;
1) Enacted as regulations: authorized under
regulatory powers granted to local
governments in the zoning and subdivision
state enabling legislation that authorizes
their control of land use and development.
2) Enacted as taxes: generally requires
explicit state enabling legislation; must
comply with constitutional provisions
regarding taxes, including uniformity;
thus, not a form of private financing.
II. Geographically isolate and assess infrastructure
beneficiaries
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A. Special-assessment financing: financing of
infrastructure that confers special benefits
(property value increases); costs are directly
assessed from beneficiaries
1) Traditional special-assessment district:
financially, administratively, politically, and
institutionally dependent government unit
legally restricted to financing infrastructure
that confers special benefits; limits private
financing to on-site and other highly
localized infrastructure
2) Symbiotic use of special-assessment districts
and developer exactions: traditional dependent
special-assessment district formed upon
developer initiative to access tax-exempt funds
and lower the cost of exactions; facilitates
private financing of facilities that confer
general benefits; legally problematic
B. Independent special district: financially,
administratively, politically, and
institutionally independent government bodies
through which private funds can be tapped for
infrastructure that confers general benefits
APPENDIX 3
Sometimes, development fees are adopted as taxes. In most
states, the adoption of development fees as taxes requires explicit
state enabling legislation, and the fees must comply with constitutional
tax provisions. For instance, they must be allocated and dispersed from
general government funds, and must conform to the uniformity requirement
that stipulates that taxes be collected and dispersed
nondiscriminatorily. The uniformity requirement precludes the
imposition of development fees as a condition of development approval;
their payment cannot be enforced through denial or approval of the
rights to build, develop, or occupy a structure. Therefore, in contrast
to development fees adopted as regulations, fees adopted as taxes must
be independent of the development process; they must apply to all
properties uniformly; and, therefore, developing property cannot be
singled out to pay them. Payment of such fees is generally enforced
through liens on property--liens that can be imposed at anytime during
the development process.
Aside from constitutional limitations, there are relatively few
other limitations on the administration of development fees that are
adopted as taxes. Relative to fees adopted as regulations, there are,
for instance, few restrictions on the level at which they may be set,
and the use to which their revenue may be put; the level at which they
are set and the use to which their revenue is allocated need not be
related to the cost of the facilities required to serve those who pay
them. Rational nexus does not apply to development fees that are
adopted as taxes, so governments have more discretion in their
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collection and dispersement. Furthermore, because they need not conform
to the rational nexus criteria, they need not be used to the benefit of
those who pay them and can, like other taxes, be used to redistribute
income. Thus, fees adopted as taxes do not really constitute a form of
private financing. (Snyder and Stegman, 1986, pp. 60-61)
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